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1. MAIN FEATURES OF THE ECONOMY 
Togo is the smallest of the West-African franco-phone 
countries, with an area of about 56,000 square kilometers. It 
extends about 660 kilometers north to south between the border 
with Burkina Faso and the Gulf of Guinea. The extension in the 
East-West direction averages about 100 kilometers, between the 
borders with Ghana and Benin. The climate is predominantly 
tropical, even though the extreme north shows some 
characteristics of the Sahelian semi-arid climate. Average 
rainfall is about 1,500 millimeters per year {approximately 60 
inches), distributed in two rainy seasons in the south, and only 
one in the north. 
Population was estimated at about 2.9 million people in 
1985, growing at a rate of 3.3 percent per year~/. Average 
population density is about 50 inhabitants per square kilometer, 
highly concentrated in the south (region maritime), where it 
reaches 170 inhabitants per square kilometer. There are about 40 
different ethnic groups in the territory (Aggrey), among which 
.!/ Estimates of The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and 
the "Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique" 
(Bergougniou). The World Bank estimates a population of 3.06 
million for 1985. At the current growth rate the population 
duplicates every 21 years. 
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the Ewe and the Kabye predominate, with 45 percent and 35 percent 
of the population respectively. Even though the official 
language is the French, vernacular languages dominate in rural 
areas. More than half of the population follows animist beliefs, 
while Christians represent about 30 percent of the population, 
and Muslims approximately 10 percent (EIU). 
The country gained independence from France in 1960, and 
since 1967 has been ruled by President Gnassingbe Eyadema, with 
the support of the "Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais" (RPT), sole 
legal political movement, and the army. Domestic policies 
combine nationalism, state corporatism, and free enterprise, 
while following a non-aligned international policy. The country 
has relied increasingly on foreign aid from western countries in 
the 1980s, while strengthening relationships with France under 
the Chirac government, i.e., since March 1986 (EIU). 
The Economy 
Agriculture, phosphate mining and commerce are the three 
principal activities in the Togo economy. Together they account 
for almost two-thirds of gross domestic product (GDP}, and employ 
85 percent of the labor force. Phosphate exports account for 
more than 40 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings, 
while export crops (cocoa, coffee and cotton) generate 25 percent 
of export revenues. On the other hand commerce, primarily re-
export and transit trade, has become an important source of 
income for the country {World Bank}. 
3 
The Togo economy has experienced periods of contraction and 
stagnation over the last decade, showing signs of partial 
recovery only in recent years. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, real 
GDP has q~~~~~~~£ between 1978 and 1985, most dramatically in the 
years 1981 through 1983. Average real GDP decline in the period 
1978-1985 was almost one percent per year, what resulted in an 
average drop in real GDP pe:i::._£<!.PJ.ta of more than 4 percent per 
year (see Table 2). Per capita GDP in 1985 was US$ 248. 
The economic decline of the early 1980s has its roots in 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, and heavy external 
borrowing, undertaken during the second half of the 1970s. These 
policies were aimed at supporting and ambitious public investment 
program triggered by a substantial price increase in the 
phosphate world market, which proved to be short-lived. The 
financing of the investment program through external borrowing, 
and the poor performance of most of the public enterprises 
created under the program led to the financial crisis and 
economic decline observed between 1978 and 1983 (World Bank). A 
drought, and recession in Nigeria, the most important regional 
market for official and informal trade, contributed to this 
economic contraction of the early 1980s. 
The years 1984 and 1985 have been years of gradual recovery. 
For the first time since 1978 real GDP per capita A~S!'...~.§!~~Q in 
1985 (although a modest 0.2 percent). The primary sector 
{agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing} was a leading 
sector in this recovery, followed by commerce, and construction 
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Table 1 
Togot Gross Do1estic Product by Sector of Origin in Constant Prices, 1978-1985 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year 
Sector 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
billian1 of 1978 CFA francs 
Priory 54.4 48.8 50.2 49.9 45.3 45.8 51.5 52.7 
Agriculture 46.9 41.4 42.8 42.2 37.2 36.9 42.4 43.2 
Livestock, For1stry 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.7 8.1 8.9 9.1 9.5 
ind Fishing 
Secondary 45.2 49.6 49.0 41.4 42.6 39.8 36.4 38.1 
lining 12.0 18.2 18.8 14.4 15.8 15.4 15.2 14.3 
linuf acture 12.5 13.3 13.6 14.2 14.8 13.7 11.2 U.8 
Construction 20.7 l8.1 16.6 12.8 12.0 10.7 10.0 12.0 
and Energy 
Tertiary 100.2 100.7 103.4 104.2 100.4 92.6 92.4 95.9 
Tnn1port, Coa1erce 79.4 78.5 82.0 82.1 79.9 71.9 72.4 75.6 
and Services 
&overnent 20.B 22.2 21.4 22.1 20.5 20.7 20.0 20.3 
GDP at ftarket Prices 19'.8 19'.1 202.6 195.5 l88.3 178.2 180.3 186.7 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I1plicit 8flP dtflatar 100.0 106.8 117.7 132.0 143.2 157.9 162.5 169.0 
1978•100 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~--------
Sauret: larld Bank, 'Country Ecana1ic "111randu11 , June 1987, and the author's calculatians. 
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Table 2 
Taqo: 6rG1th Rates of Real &DP by Sector of Origin, 1978-1985 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ytar P.-iad Averlfll 
Sector 
-------------------------1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1978-85 1978-82 1982-85 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
&rllllth ratn in pwcnt ovtr pr1Yi111 y1ar ---- Cl ptr year> ------
Pri1ary -10.3 2.9 -0.6 -9.2 1.1 12.4 2.3 -0.2 -4.3 5.3 
Agriculture -11.7 3.4 -1.4 -11.8 -0.B 14.9 t.9 -o.a -5.4 5.3 
Livestock, Forestry -1.3 o.o 4.1 5.2 9.9 2.2 4.4 3.5 2.0 5.5 
and Fishing 
Secondary 9.7 -1.2 -15.5 2.9 -6.6 -B.5 4.7 -2.1 -1.0 -3.5 
"ining 51.7 3.3 -23.4 9.7 -2.5 -1.3 -5.9 4.5 10.3 -3.3 
"anufact11re 6.4 2.3 4.4 4.2 -7.4 -JB.2 5.4 -0.4 4.3 -6.8 
Construction -12.6 -8.3 -22.9 -6.2 -10.s -6.5 20.0 --It.a -12.5 0.9 
and Energy 
Tertiary 0.5 2.7 0.8 -3.6 -7.8 -0.2 3.8 -0.6 0.1 -1.4 
Transport, Cot11rce -1.1 4.5 0.1 -2.7 -10.0 0.7 4.4 -0.6 0.2 -1.6 
and Services 
Sovernaent 6.7 -3.6 3.3 -7.2 1.0 -3.4 1.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
GDP at "arket Prices -0.4 1.8 -3.5 -3.7 -5.4 1.2 3.5 -0.9 -1.4 -0.2 
Real &DP per capita• -3.7 -1.5 -6.8 -7.0 -8.7 -2.1 0.2 -4.2 -4.7 -3.5 
-------------------------------------------~·-------------------------,.---------------~----------------------
Source: Tilble 1. 
a Uses 1verage papul1tion grlllfth of 3.3 ptrcent per yell' lltorld Bank). 
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and energy (see Tables 1 and 2). An stabilization program 
implemented after 1983, supported by the IMF and the World Bank 
through stand-by credit and structural adjustment loans, has 
induced this partial recovery. The program has reduced the 
current account deficit in the balance of payments and the fiscal 
deficit, as seen in Table 3. The government has also undertaken 
a program of privatization and rationalization of public 
enterprises, which has allegedly contributed to the gradual 
economic recovery observed in recent years. 
The Rural Sector 
The contribution of the primary (rural) sector to total 
gross domestic product increased from about 27 percent in the 
late 1980s to over 30 percent in the last three years of 
available data {see Appendix Table 2)~/. Given that 77 percent of 
the population depends on the primary sector, the average GDP per 
capita in this sector can be estimated for 1985 at about US$ 100 
per capita per year. This figure contrasts with an annual GDP 
per capita of about US$ 750 in the non-primary sectors, 
indicating an average per capita productivity 7.5 times higher in 
these sectors than in the primary sector. 
Agriculture, i.e., crop production, accounts for most of the 
contribution of the primary sector to total GDP. Livestock, 
forestry and fisheries represent only about 16 percent of the 
~/ The terms "rural" and "primary" are used interchangeably 
here, even though in Togo as in all countries several non-primary 
activities are carried out in rural areas. 
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Table 3 
Togo: Selected EconD1ic Indicators, 1978-1985 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
YHr Peri ad 
Indicator Averagn 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1978-85 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trade illld Pay1ent1 
Current account 
deficit (% of GDP> 30.3 29.6 15.9 16.7 20.1 15.9 10.3 12.0 18.9 
Ter1s of Trade (1980=100) 63.2 70.3 100.0 91. 7 94.8 103.5 112.2 103.6 
Exchange rate IFCFA per US$) 225.6 212.B 211.3 271.7 328.6 381.1 437,0 449.3 
Brass llalntic hvinp 20.4 23.2 21.6 15.0 12.2 13.9 16.0 15.6 17.2 
1% of GDPl 
.. Oii Fhtd lnvnt1nt 47.8 47.7 34.5 26.2 23.6 20.0 22.5 23.5 30.7 
II of GDP! 
Public Finance 
6overn11nt 
revenue 1% of GDP> 26.5 27.4 33.3 26.0 29.9 27.S 30.2 31.5 29.0 
expenditure fl of GDPl 30.9 44.2 .to.a 33.2 38.3 35.3 37.5 38.1 37.3 
Fiscal deficit II of &DP> 4.4 16.8 7.6 7.2 8.4 1.7 7.3 6.6 8.3 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-----
Sources Based on figures reported in World Billlk 1 •Country Econo1ic llelorandu1•, ~une 1987. 
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primary sector GDP (Appendix Table 2). Among the agricultural 
activities, food crops contribute almost 90 percent of the value 
of agricultural production. Most important food crops are yams, 
manioc (cassava), maize, and millet and sorghum, in that order. 
Cash crops, primarily cocoa, coffee, cotton, and peanuts, 
contribute only 11 percent of agricultural GDP, but generate more 
than one-fourth of the country's total export earnings. Hence 
the attention that recent development plans have given to coffee, 
cocoa and cotton, as well as to the production of irrigated crops 
such as sugar cane, rice, fruits and vegetables. Promotion of 
cotton has been particularly successful in terms of physical 
production, which doubled in four years, although recent falls in 
world prices have compromised the economic returns of this crop 
( EIU) . 
2. MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
As a member of the West-African Monetary Union ("Union 
Monetaire Ouest-Africaine, UMOA), Togo's foreign exchange and 
monetary policies are subordinated to those of the Union, 
exercised through the "Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest" (BCEAO). The common currency in the UMOA area is the 
CFA franc~/, pegged to the French franc at a fixed exchange rate 
---- -·---
~/ Franc of the "Cooperation Financiere en Afrique" (CFA). 
The UMOA currency area includes Benin, Burkina Faso, cote 
d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. 
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of 50 CFA francs per French franc. Free convertibility exists 
between the two currencies, supported by the French Treasury 
through overdraft facilities in the operations account held at 
the Treasury by the BCEAO. As a consequence, exchange-rate 
fluctuations of the CFA franc against all other major currencies 
follow exactly the behavior of the French franc. It is 
interesting to note that the French franc, in turn, is bound by 
the exchange agreements of the European Community. Therefore, 
linkages between domestic economic phenomena in UMOA member 
countries and the value of their currency against non-European 
currencies can be considered rather remote. 
A similar lack of autonomy exists in controlling money 
supply and domestic credit in each UMOA member country. The 
BCEAO sets rediscount targets for each country, determines 
rediscount rates and intermediation margins (hence, lending 
rates), and most deposit rates!/. In each country, the "National 
Credit Committee" determines the country's credit allocation 
policies, within the rediscounting limits established by the 
BCEAO. As discussed below, selective credit policies determined 
by the National Credit Committee in Togo are in practice 
primarily indicative, and existing enforcement mechanisms are not 
implemented. 
!/ Regulations on lending and deposit rates are reviewed in 
detail later in this chapter. 
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2.1. Monetary Policy 
The evolution of the major monetary aggregates between 1978 
and 1986 is portrayed in Table 4. Most indicators show a rather 
unstable path during this period that can be associated with the 
overall economic stagnation discussed above, and with the 
stabilization efforts of recent years. A brief analysis of these 
major monetary aggregates follows. 
The money supply expanded significantly between 1978 and 
1982, and reduced its pace of growth from 1983 onwards. The 
average annual rate of monetary expansion in the 1978-82 sub-
period was almost 17 percent, even though most of the expansion 
occurred in 1981 (see Table 4). In contrast, total money grew at 
an average annual rate of about 8 percent between 1983 and 1986, 
i.e, less than half the average rate of the preceding years. 
The figures reported in Table 4 indicate that the 
fluctuations in the money supply were accounted for primarily by 
the unstable growth of currency in circulation and demand 
deposits. On the other hand, quasi-money (savings and time 
deposits) shows a relatively steady growth rate between 1980 and 
1986 fluctuating between 20 percent and 33 percent per year 
during this period. As will be shown later in this chapter, this 
behavior of the interest-bearing liabilities of the banking 
system is responsible for the gradual financial deepening 
observed in the Togo economy in the 1980s. 
The monetary expansion between 1978 and 1982 is clearly 
associated with the increase in domestic credit to the government 
] 1 
Table 4 
Togo: "onetary Survey, 1978-1986 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ ,,,_ _____________ 
Yur 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
•• 
llallttary Aggr191t11 in billions af CFA fruc1, ind of llKllbw af Hell yHr-
ltoney Supply 65.0 66.5 72.6 100.6 117.2 117.B 136.1 143.2 158.B 
Currency outside banks 
plus de1and dep11its 48.1 52.7 55.3 80.0 90.1 83.1 90.7 82.7 84.4 
Quasi-.oney 16.9 13.9 17.2 20.6 27.1 3-4.7 45.4 60.5 74.4 
Net Foreign Assets 9.9 9.5 4.6 32.1 47.3 52.0 68.0 70.2 72.2 
Long-Teri Foreign Borrowing 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.3 
Daustic Credit 57.8 62.3 69.7 77.1 80.B 75.3 65.B 62.0 87.2 
Net clai1s an govern11nt 6.2 4.0 4.5 14.3 12.8 10.0 0.8 -4.9 3.4 
Clai11 an private sector• 51.6 58.4 65.2 62.7 68.0 65.3 65.1 66.9 83.8 
Other ite11 !net> 1.1 3.4 -0.5 6.6 B.7 7.6 ~.2 -3.8 -2.0 
B. Annual ptrClntlf 1 chlllgl 
ltoney Supply 2.4 9.1 38.6 10.5 0.5 15.6 5.2 10.9 
Currency outside bank1 
plus de1and deposits 9.5 5.1 44.5 12.6 -7.8 9.2 -e.8 2.0 
Quasi -1DRey -17.6 24.l 19.6 31.6 28.0 30.8 33.2 23.0 
Net Foreign Assets -4.4 -51.4 :i96.3 47.4 9,8 30.9 3.2 2.9 
Long-Teri Foreign Borrowing 14.4 16.8 -10.8 13.6 -17.7 2.7 -6.B 28.7 
Do1esti c Cradi t 7.9 U.9 10.5 4.B -6.8 -12.6 -5.8 40.6 
Net cla111 an govern11nt -35.9 14.4 216.3 -11.0 -21.B -92.5 -717.3 -168.4 
Claias on private sector 13.2 11. 7 -3.8 8.4 -4.0 -0.4 2.9 2:i.2 
Other iteas (net> 218.9 -113.6 -1539.1 30,8 -11.8 -155.0 -9.0 -47.9 
--~------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Ilf', Jnttrnati11111l Fi111ei1l st1ti1tic1, 1986 y1arbaok, and "•Y 1987. 
a Al of end of October for 1986. 
b Includ1s other financial in1titutian1. 
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observed during the same period. As shown in Table 4, net claims 
on government more than doubled between 1978 and 1982, reaching a 
maximum in 1981, the year of the largest expansion in money 
creation. Government borrowing, primarily to service the 
external debt contracted during the investment program of the 
late 1970s and to finance public enterprises, appears to explain 
the monetary expansion of the period under analysis. 
Domestic credit contracted drastically after 1982, in line 
with the stabilization program implemented starting in 1983. 
This contraction affected primarily the net claims on government, 
which decreased dramatically in this period, reaching a net 
creditor position in 1985. The adoption of stringent measures to 
reduce the fiscal deficit under the IMF agreements, and the 
enactment of a new tax code in 1984 have contributed to 
substantially reduce government borrowing. Consistent with this 
behavior of domestic credit, monetary growth reduced 
substantially its pace after 1982 with respect to that observed 
in the previous years (see Table 4). The two-digit growth rates 
observed in 1984 and 1986 can be attributed to two totally 
different causes. The expansion observed in 1984 can be 
associated with the need to compensate for the drastic "under-
shooting" of money growth in the preceding year, whereas the 
partial recovery of the economy observed in 1985 (and expected in 
1986) would explain the 11 percent money growth registered in 
1986. 
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By the end of 1986, Togo appears to have achieved some 
degree of financial stabilization and initiated gradual economic 
recovery. The agreements with the IMF and the World Bank call 
for further improvements in fiscal revenue mechanisms, expansion 
of the private sector, and reduction and rationalization of 
investment programs. Emphasis on rural development and 
rehabilitation of infrastructure are expected to foster sustained 
economic growth in the medium to long term. 
2.2. Financial Development 
The main financial deepening indicators for the years 1978 
through 1985 are summarized in Table 5. The ratio of total money 
over GDP appears surprisingly high for Togo's level of 
development. Indeed, the ratios observed in Togo from 1982 
onwards are three times those registered in Niger (Cuevas, 1986), 
and twice as high as those reported for Mali (Masini). Financial 
deepening ratios measured in Kenya (Skon), Somalia (Tammi), and 
Zaire (Di Antonio) during the same time period were also clearly 
lower than the ratios presented in Table 5 for Togo. 
A hypothesis to explain the differences across countries 
observed above that merits further research is that financial 
deepening is driven by the performance of the tertiary sector in 
the economy, most notably commerce. This sector is not only 
highly monetized but also involves constant transactions (i.e., a 
high velocity of money circulation), thus requiring 
intermediation services relatively more than the other sectors in 
] LI 
Table 5 
Togo: Financial Deepening Indicators, 1978-1985 
Yw 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
A. llanttary Aggregat11 11 Percent ctf SIP 
Total l!oney 32.5 31.3 30.4 39.0 43.4 41.9 
Currency in circulation 10.4 10.1 11.7 19.7 20.1 16.2 
Deposit lloney 22.1 21.2 18.8 19.3 23.3 25.7 
Net Foreign Assets 5.0 4.5 t.9 12.4 17.5 18.5 
Do1esti c Credit 28.9 29.3 29.2 29.9 30.0 26.8 
Net clailS on 9overn11nt 3.1 1. 9 1.9 5.6 4.7 3.5 
Clai1s on private sector 25.8 27.5 27.3 24.3 25.2 23.2 
I. Inflation R1t11 and Changt in R11l ltanty, Perctnt Plr Y11r 
Inflation rates 
CPI ~frican fatilies <CPll 7.5 12.4 19.7 11.1 9.4 
l1plicit GDP deflater !IGO) 6.8 10.2 12.2 9.5 10.2 
Change in Real lloney 
Deflated by CPI -4.7 -2.9 15.8 4.9 -8.1 
Deflated by 160 -4.1 -1.0 23.6 7.3 -8.8 
1984 
46.4 
12.6 
33.8 
23.2 
22.5 
0.3 
22.2 
-3.6 
2.9 
19.8 
12.3 
Period 
Avtrq11 
1985 1978-85 
45.4 38.8 
12.4 14.2 
33.0 24.6 
22.2 13.2 
19.6 27.0 
-1.6 2.4 
21.2 24.6 
-1.8 7.8 
4.0 7.8 
7.1 4.6 
t.2 4.3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------~------------------·-----------
Source: Table 4, Appendix Table 1, and IllF, Inter11ti1111l Fi1111ci1l St1tiltic1. 
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the economy. A glance at the figures reported for the countries 
indicated above shows that those with financial deepening ratios 
above 20 percent had more than 40 percent of the country's GDP 
accounted for by the tertiary sector (Togo, Kenya, Zaire). In 
contrast, the economies where the contribution of the tertiary 
sector to total GDP was less than 40 percent did not reach 
financial deepening ratios above 20 percent. 
Financial deepening in Togo, as measured by the increase in 
the ratio of total money to GDP, occurred steadily after 1980. 
Total money over GDP grew from about 30 percent in 1980 to over 
45 percent in 1985. Deposit money, rather than currency in 
circulation, accounts for the increase in the deepening ratio. 
As shown in Table 5, deposit money over GDP went from 19 percent 
in 1980 to 33 percent in 1985. Furthermore, it was quasi-money 
(interest-earning deposits) the component of total money that was 
indeed growing as percent of GDP in the period under analysis. 
The ratio of quasi-money to GDP (not shown in Table 5) increased 
from 8 percent in 1981 to 19 percent in 1985, thus contributing 
11 percentage points to the 15-point increase in total money over 
GDP. 
Finally, several positive features of the Togo economy are 
highlighted by the figures reported in Table 5: (a), net foreign 
assets as percent of GDP have increased substantially since 1981; 
(b), the private sector is the major recipient of domestic credit 
(over 90 percent on average), after the crisis of the early 
1980s, and (c), the inflation rate returned to fairly low levels 
16 
in 1984 and 1985, after having reached double-digits as a 
consequence of the monetary expansion of the years 1980 to 1982. 
2.3. Financial Policy 
This section reviews two major elements of financial 
regulation in Togo: interest rates, and selective credit 
policies. As indicated earlier, interest rates are determined by 
the regulations of the BCEAO, while credit allocation guidelines 
are issued in Togo by the National Credit Committee. 
Interest Rates 
Three sets of interest rates are important in the regulatory 
environment surrounding Togolese financial institutions. First, 
the lending rates determined by the rediscount rates and 
intermediation margins established by the BCEAO; second, the 
interest rates authorized to pay on deposits, and third, the 
interest rates prevailing in the UMOA's money market. 
~jrst, rediscount rates have been systematically reduced by 
the BCEAO since 1984, after been kept at the same level for two 
years. As shown in Table 6, both the 11 taux d'escompte 
pr~f~rentiel" (TEP) and the ''taux d'escompte normal" (TEN) are 4 
points lower today than they were in 1982-1984. Since limits on 
intermediation margins have remained the same, lending rates have 
diminished in agreement with the reductions in the rediscount 
rates. Table 6 shows the ranges of lending rates determined by 
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Table 6 
BCEAO Regulations and Lending Rates, 1982 - 1987 
hriod 
Regulation 
1982-1984 1995-Apr.86 Apr.-Sept.8" Stpt.86-present 
Rldisco1D1t Rates, 1 
Preferential rate ITEP> fixed 10 B 7 6 
Nonal rate !TEN) fixed 12.5 10.5 9.5 8.5 
Lending Rat11, •Y Lint of Credit 
- - - - - - - C Range of rat11, l l - - - - - - - - -
Short and "ediua-Ter1 Loans 
Seasonal crop financing 
and agr. exports TEP + 1 - 2'.t 11 - 12 
Stall and 1ediu1-sized 
doaestic firas• TEP + 1 - 3'.t 11 - 13 
First ho1e construction for 
UIUIA residents., TEP + 1 - 31 11 - 13 
Other short and 1edi111-ter1 TEN + 0 - 5% 12.5 - 17.5 
Long-Ten Loans 
Saall and 1ediu1•1izld 
doaestic fir11• c TEP + 1 - 3% 11 - 13 
First hote construction for 
UlllA residents• c TEP + 1 - 31 11 - 13 
Other long-tera TEI + 0 - 51 12.5 - 17.5 
Ovtnll R11191 11 - 17.5 
Source: BCEAO 
a Mith overall outstanding dlbt of less than 30 1illiot FCFA. 
b loans less than 1.5 1illion FCFA. 
c Residual 1aturity less than 10 years. 
9 - 10 8-9 7 - B 
9 - 11 8 - 10 7 - 9 
9 - 11 B - 10 7 - ' 
10.5 - 15.5 9.5 - 14.5 8.5 - 13.5 
9 - 11 8 - 10 7 - 9 
9 - 11 e - 10 7 - 9 
10.5 - 15.5 9.5 - 14.5 8.5 - 13.5 
9 - 15.5 B - 14.5 7 - 13.5 
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the BCEAO between 1982 and 1987, for the different lines of 
credit contemplated in the regulations. 
Agriculture, small and medium-size enterprises, and low-
income housing are the sectors eligible for loans at preferential 
rates, which result in lending rates substantially lower than 
those applicable to non-targeted loans (see Table 6). However, 
all lines of credit considered, the policy determines a rather 
wide range of lending rates authorized to the banks, which at 
present goes from 7 percent to 13.5 percent. In practice, this 
range gives the banks some flexibility to adjust their lending 
rates to the perceived riskiness of different borrowers. 
In real terms, the lending rates prevailing in most of 1986 
represented a range between 6.7 percent and 13.2 percentQI. In 
previous years, real lending rates fluctuated between 5.4 percent 
and 17.3 percent, depending on the year and the line of credit. 
If the inflation of the implicit GDP deflater (IGD) is used for 
these calculations, the real lending rates for the period 1982-
1985 vary between 3.8 and 11.5 percent. 
~econd, interest rates authorized by the BCEAO to pay on 
deposits have also decreased since 1984; indeed, they are 
adjusted every time rediscount rates are modified. Table 7 shows 
that current nominal interest rates on private deposits are 3 to 
2.5 percentage points lower than in 1982-1984, depending on 
£! Real interest rates calculated subtracting the inflation 
of the CPI from the nominal rates. 
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balance amount and maturity~/. In spite of this reduction, real 
interest rates on savings and time deposits have been positive 
throughout the period under analysis. Inflation rates (CPI 
index) prevailing in 1986 imply real interest rates between 3 
percent and almost 7 percent for private deposits, depending on 
size of balance and maturity. For the years 1982 to 1985, real 
deposit rates fluctuated between 1.7 and 11.3 percent if the CPI 
inflation is used, or between 0.05 and 5.5 percent if the 
inflation of the IGD is considered in the calculations. Even 
though the effective return to depositors may be lower due to 
transaction costs of holding deposit accounts, this structure of 
real deposit rates appears favorable to domestic savings 
mobilization in comparison to many other developing economies. 
It is important to discuss the relationships between 
rediscount rates and deposit rates, and their implications in 
terms of the gross spreads faced by the financial intermediaries, 
and the implicit incentives (or lack thereof) to deposit 
mobilization. A comparison of the figures reported in Tables 6 
and 7 shows that it has been always cheaper for banks to capture 
deposits from the public, even at the highest rates (long term, 
large balances), than to borrow from the BCEAO at the normal 
rediscount rate (TEN). Furthermore, it is more profitable to 
§/ Not considering demand deposits, where the obligation to 
pay interest was suspended in January 1985, or public sector 
deposits. According to BCEAO regulations, interest rates on 
public sector deposits are negotiated with the banks; in 
practice, they tend to follow the rate structure of private 
deposits. 
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lend to preferential sectors (e.g., agriculture) out of deposit 
resources than to rediscount the loan with the BCEAO at the 
preferential rate (TEP). Not surprisingly, as will be discussed 
further in the following chapter, only two (public) banks use 
rediscount at all. 
The gross spreads implicit in the interest-rate regulations 
described in Tables 6 and 7 have shrunk since 1982 from a range 
between 5 and 17.5 percent to a range of 5 to 13.5 percent after 
September 1986. Reserve requirements are not considered in these 
estimates since in fact they are not enforced, and in practice 
banks hold their reserves as deposits in the UMOA's money market, 
earning fairly attractive rates of return. 
The gradual reduction in the gross spreads implicit in the 
BCEAO interest-rate policy has not been substantial, even though 
it may have affected the lending policies of financial 
intermediaries. Furthermore, the gap between rediscount rates 
and deposit rates has maintained the incentives to rely upon 
deposit mobilization instead of BCEAO borrowing as primary source 
of funds. This incentive to banks and the positive real returns 
to savings pointed out above help explain the growing performance 
of quasi-money (interest-bearing deposits) as percent of GDP in 
recent years. 
Fina~J.y, the interest rates prevailing in the UMOA's money 
market constitute another major factor conditioning the decisions 
of financial intermediaries in Togo. The UMOA's money market was 
created in 1975 with the objective of providing the BCEAO with an 
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additional instrument of monetary control. It was also expected 
that the money market would help reduce capital flight from the 
currency area by offering the banks a suitable use for their 
excess reserves. 
The BCEAO intervenes heavily in the OMOA money market 
through sale and purchase operations to control the interest 
rates prevailing at any point in time. The average annual rates 
in the money market for the period 1975-1986 are reported in 
Table 8. Not surprisingly, the behavior of these rates follow 
closely the fluctuations (although not the levels) of the other 
rates administered directly by the BCEAO. 
An important consequence of the access to money market 
transactions by Togolese banks is that it makes holding excess 
reserves at money market rates more attractive than lending under 
preferential lines of credit. As an illustration, the current 
maximum lending rate applicable to short-term agricultural loans 
is 8 percent per year (see Table 6), which probably reduces to 
about 7 percent when allowance is made for default risk?/. On the 
other hand, a three-month deposit in the money market yielding 
8.7 percent per year ~ith certainty offers a more attractive 
alternative to the financial institution. Through this mechanism 
the existence of the money market has an important effect on the 
results of the selective credit policy discussed below. 
11 As of the end of October 1986, arrears and doubtful loans 
accounted for almost 9 percent of total credit to the economy 
(excluding the government) by the banking system. There is 
consensus among Togolese bankers that lending to agriculture is 
considerably riskier than lending to any other sector. 
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Tilble B 
Average Annual Interest Rates in the UrtOA Money Muket, 1975 - 1986 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Overnight One-month Three-•onth 
Year Deposits Advances Deposits Advances Deposits Advances 
-------------------
x 
---------------------
x 
--------------------
% 
----------
1975 7.000 7.125 
1976 6.875 7.125 
1977 7.000 7.250 
1979 7.250 7.500 7.063 7.313 7.125 7.375 
1979 6.938 7.1BB 7.063 7.313 7.313 7.563 
1980 10.250 10.531 10.375 10.625 10.625 10. 875 
1981 14.500 14.813 14.625 14.875 14.875 15.125 
1982 14.000 14.333 14. 125 14.375 14.375 14.625 
1983 11. 500 11.813 11. 625 12.875 11. 875 12.125 
1984 11. 125 11. 406 11. 250 11. 500 11. BOO 11. 750 
1985 10.625 10.875 10.750 11. 000 11. 000 11. 250 
1986 B.333 8.583 8.458 8.708 8.656 8.906 
Source: Toh (1986>, and BCEAO. 
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Selective Credit Policy 
The selective credit policy established by the National 
Credit Committee of Togo attempts to favor agriculture, small and 
medium-size enterprises, and low-income housing ("habitat 
social"). For 1986, the Committee requested the financial 
institutions to allocate at least 40 percent of their portfolios 
to these priority sectors, distributed as follows: 15 percent to 
agriculture, 2 percent to livestock and fisheries, 15 percent to 
small and medium-size enterprises, and 8 percent to low-income 
housing. A recent report of the Committee indicates that by 
September 1986 none of these objectives was being met (Comite 
National du Credit du Togo, 1987). Only 17.5 percent of total 
credit had gone to the priority sectors: 4 percent to 
agriculture, 0.5 percent to livestock and fisheries, 8 percent to 
small and medium-size enterprises, and about 5 percent to social 
housing. 
The Committee did not expect that the intended targets would 
be met, nor was this a surprising outcome of the selective credit 
policy. Three factors contribute to this result: first, there 
are no real sanctions to the banks that do not follow the 
Committee's requests. Even though some sanctions have been 
defined, they are not enforced in practice. Second, the UMOA's 
money market offers a profitable and secure alternative to risky 
loans to preferential sectors. Third and most important, the 
sectors the policy attempts to favor do not constitute an 
attractive clientele to Togolese banks. 
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"There is no bankable clients in agriculture" is a common 
response of private bankers, who consider the selective credit 
policy of the National Committee as primarily "indicative"§./. 
Furthermore, many loans classified as agriculture in the books 
are large loans to well established agricultural marketing 
enterprises, therefore the share of agriculture in the banks' 
overall portfolio reported above should not be interpreted as 
credit to farmers. 
The lack of effectiveness of selective credit allocation 
policies favoring agriculture is well illustrated in Table 9, 
where sectoral shares in total institutional credit are 
contrasted against sectoral shares of GDP, using the averages for 
the period 1981-1985. The primary sector (agriculture, 
livestock, forestry and fisheries) accounted for only 2.4 percent 
of total institutional credit21, a rather low share even for West-
African standards. Given that the primary sector contributed 
one-third of total GDP in the same period, the resulting credit-
to-GDP ratio is only 1.5 percent. This figure is consistent with 
the findings of a recent study (Cuevas, 1987), which estimated 
credit-to-gross income ratios between 2.7 and 3 percent for rural 
§./ Rather naively, the National Committee maintained 
basically the same credit targets for 1987 (Comite National du 
Credit du Togo). 
21 This figure does not consider credit union activity, 
important in Togo, since credit unions do no report their lending 
to the Central Bank. The credit union movement will be analyzed 
in detail later in this report. 
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Table 9 
Togo1 Sectoral Shares in GDP and in Total Institutional Credit, 
and Credit to GDP Ratios. Averages for the Period 1981 - 1985 
Sector 
Priaaryb 
Secondary 
Mining 
Manufacture 
Construction 
and Energy 
Tertiaryc 
All Non-government 
Share in Non-
6overnment GDP 
at Market Prices 
x. 
33.0 
25.1 
11. 1 
8.0 
6.0 
41. 9 
100.0 
Source: Appendix Tables 2 and 6. 
Share in Total 
Institutional 
Credit• 
x. 
2.4 
42.0 
13.7 
18.5 
9.B 
55.6 
100.0 
Credit to 
GDP 
ratio 
7. 
1. 5 
33.9 
25.0 
47.1 
32.7 
26.B 
20.2 
a Does not include credit unions among the sources. Includes public 
institutions as beneficiaries. 
b Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry and Fisheries. 
c Transport, Co1merce and Services. 
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households, including loans that would not be classified as 
agriculture under common banking standards. 
The secondary and tertiary sectors compensate for the 
imbalance between contribution to GDP and share in institutional 
credit observed for agriculture. Manufacture appears as the sub-
sector with the most disproportionate share in total credit. 
Overall, the tertiary sector (primarily commerce) is the dominant 
end-use of institutional credit, and at the same time is the 
sector with the largest contribution to GDP. 
In summary, this chapter has highlighted the financial 
stabilization attained by the Togo economy after the crisis of 
the early 1980s. In spite of the economic contraction, financial 
deepening ratios increased steadily between 1981 and 1985, due 
primarily to the growth of interest-bearing liabilities of the 
banking system {quasi-money). Interest-rates regulations have 
contributed to this performance maintaining relatively high 
rediscount rates, thus making more attractive for financial 
institutions to capture deposits from the general public than to 
borrow from the BCEAO. Even though gross spreads implicit in the 
BCEAO regulations have diminished during the period under 
analysis, the UMOA's money market has provided a profitable 
alternative for banks' liquidity. This has contributed to make 
selective credit policies ineffective. 
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3. PERFORMANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The formal financial sector of Togo is comprised by nine 
banks and two non-bank financial institutions. Overall, banks 
accounted for 95.2 percent of private deposits in 1986, and for 
98.5 percent of total lending to non-government clientele in the 
same year. Three of the banks are public development banks: the 
"Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole" (CNCA}, the "Banque 
Togolaise de Developpement" (BTD), and the 11 Societe Nationale 
d'Investissements" (SNI)~O/. These banks are owned primarily by 
the state and/or public institutions'.!1/, with some equity 
underwritten by the BCEAO (in the CNCA and the BTD), the CNCA-
France (in the CNCA), the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation 
Economique and the Banque Ouest-Africaine de Developpement (in 
the BTD). 
The two most important private commercial banks are the 
"Union Togolaise de Banque" (UTB), with 35 percent of its equity 
owned by the state, the "Banque Togolaise pour le Commerce et 
l'Industrie" (BTCI), where public Togolese institutions hold 
about 40 percent of the capital. Another important bank is the 
"Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest'' (BIAO), with 
two-thirds of its equity in the hands of the BIAO group, and one-
~QI The CNCA is one of the key financial institutions 
analyzed in Chapter 6 of this report. 
*J./ Primarily the "Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale" 
(CNSS) and the "Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo" (OPAT). 
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third owned by private Togolese interests. The other three 
(smaller) banks are primarily foreign-owned: the Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (BCCI), the "Banque Arabe Lybienne 
Togolaise du Commerce Exterieur" (BALTEX}, and the "Banque 
Commerciale du Ghana" (BCG). 
Non-bank financial institutions are the "Caisse d'Epargne du 
Togo" (CET), and the credit-union movement organized around the 
"Federation des Unions Cooperatives d'Epargne et de Credit" 
(FUCEC). Togo credit unions are registered under the authority 
of the Ministry of Rural Development, and are not regulated by 
the BCEAO. However, their well-structured financial operations 
and the existence of a central liquidity facility at the 
Federation level justify their treatment as financial 
institutions in this report. 
The GET operates through 34 post off ices and 2 agencies, 
while 93 credit unions (Coopecs) are members of FUCEC. The 
relevance of these non-bank financial institutions relies 
precisely in their country-wide network of offices or affiliates. 
They play an important role in providing financial services to 
sectors of the population that otherwise would have limited or no 
access to these services. Moreover, the clientele/membership of 
these institutions is characterized by small depositors. As an 
illustration, the average size of passbook savings accounts in 
the CNCA is about 100 thousand francs CFA, whereas the average 
balance of the accounts held in credit unions is approximately 44 
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thousand CFA per account, and the average savings balance at the 
CET is 31 thousand francs CFA1l/. 
The Caisse d'epargne concentrates in savings operations, 
with very little credit activity and practically no retail 
lending. Credit unions on the other hand, comprise a more 
complete financial intermediary offering both deposits and 
lending services to their members. The CET and the credit-union 
movement will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 6 of this 
report. 
Table 10 describes selected features of the banking system 
in Togo. With 56 permanent branches, the banking system of Togo 
is substantially more developed, in relation to the country's 
population, than many other African countries. The average bank 
branch density in Togo is one branch per 52 thousand inhabitants, 
more than twice as large as Kenya, three-times that of Somalia, 
more than four times the density reported for Niger, and almost 
six times that of Mali 131. Almost 40 percent of all permanent 
branches are located in Lome, the capital. Most permanent 
branches (61 percent) of public development banks are outside of 
Lome, whereas the majority of the branches of private commercial 
banks (60 percent) are located in the capital city. 
1£/ Averages estimated from data reported in CNCA-Togo, 
"Rapport d'Activit6, Exercice 1984/1985" (February 1986), FUCEC-
Togo, "Development of the National Credit Union Movement" (March 
1987), and Caisse d'Epargne du Togo, "Resultats au 30 Septembre 
1986". 
~~/ See Masini, ed. (1987). 
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Table 10 
Togo: Selected Features of tht linking Sy1te1, 1986 
Bank 
Palllic Dev1lap11nt 
Banis 
CNCA 
BTD 
SNI 
Privltt ta.rcill 
Blllb 
UTB 
BTCI 
BIAD-T11go 
BCCI 
BALTEX 
BC& 
TOTAL 
Branch Net1ork 
Pertinent Periodic 
branches branches 
Nulber Perctnt Nu1ber Percent 
27 48.2 23 88.5 
18 32.1 23 88.S 
1 12.5 
2 3.6 
29 51.8 3 11.5 
11 19.6 1 3.8 
7 12.5 2 7.7 
8 14.3 
1 1.8 
1 1.8 
1 1.8 
56 100.0 26 100.0 
Sauret: BCEAO Laae, and Appendix Tables 3 and 4. 
a International Non-Financial Institutions. 
ltirket Shares 
Loans Total Drpa1its 
Assets &ener1l 6overn1ent 
Public • othtrs• 
l x '% l 
24.5 20.5 
12.4 9.7 
10.4 5.8 
1.7 5.0 
75.7 79.4 
24.6 26.9 
21.3 18.5 
13.7 15.5 
7.5 12.1 
6.0 4.2 
2.6 2.2 
100.0 100.0 
16.4 
7.1 
3.5 
5.8 
83.6 
30.9 
20.9 
17.6 
9.5 
2.7 
2.0 
10-0.0 
25.7 
17.7 
2.3 
5.7 
74.2 
ll.3 
16.8 
12.6 
9.1 
3.3 
1.1 
1oe.o 
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The CNCA is the bank with the largest number of permanent 
branches, and also maintains 23 periodic branches, all of them 
functioning outside of Lome. The UTB, the BTCI and the BIAO are 
the three largest private banks in terms of the number of 
branches, and dominate the banking system of Togo by every other 
indicator. The UTB alone has larger shares in loans, total 
assets and deposits than all public development banks taken 
together (see Table 10). As of September 1986, the three largest 
banks together accounted for 60 percent of total loans, and 61 
percent of total assets in the system. The same three banks were 
depositories of almost 70 percent of the financial savings held 
by the general public at the banking system, and of 61 percent of 
deposits held by the government and international non-financial 
institutions.!..~/. 
The dominance of the largest three banks (UTB, BTCI, and 
BIAO) in the Togo banking system has experienced only a slight 
decrease since 1980. As shown in Table 11, their share in total 
assets reduced from over 66 percent in 1980 to about 61 percent 
in 1986. This difference was captured by the BCCI, whose share in 
total assets grew from less than 2 percent in 1980 to 12 percent 
in 1986. Other banks losing market share to the BTCI were the 
BTD, the SNI, and the BCG. 
Market shares in total deposits also showed a weak tendency 
to de-concentrate between 1980 and 1986. The figures in Table 12 
14/ Deposits held primarily by the Government of Togo (more 
than 80 percent of these deposits). 
TABLE 11 
TOOl: 11\i\RKET 9lARES OF FIN.ANCIAL INSTITUTIOOS. LO.OO AND TOTAL A.5.5ETS, 1980-1986. 
( IN PEOCENT ) 
-------·-····--·-··-- ·-···· ·---- -···-·· ..... -···-·---·--·--··· ~J_Ql;l __ ""--··· ·---··-···--·-·----·--·····-·----
_ __!i8.Q . ______ -~~! ________ ~R ... ___________ 198~~L. 1984/85 ______ 1985/~~---
TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
~--~Ts i.o.oo ~rL_i~~rs _. ___ 1~_@..§ ___ Lo~--~r.~. _____ __lo.oo _~s __ 
FI~IAL 1~11.I\!l.l~.---_J _______ !. ______ %_ ___ ~----L... % % % % % % % 
C.N.C.A. 12.2 9.4 13.5 9.1 13.7 7.5 18.1 7.9 18.5 7.6 12.4 9.7 
BTO 12.6 9.3 12.6 8.3 11.9 9.1 10.3 6.4 11.1 5.9 10.4 5.8 
941 & FA 1.1 5.7 2.0 6.1 2.4 5.5 2.7 5.8 1.8 5.1 1.7 5.0 
w 
UTB 33.1 33.3 30.2 31.8 30.7 32.6 22.0 27.3 20.7 27.3 24.6 26.9 w 
BTCI 21.3 19.5 18.5 19. 7 17.6 17.2 17.0 19.0 20.3 16. 7 21.3 18.5 
BIAO-TOOl 12.4 13.6 14.1 14.6 14.2 15.1 14.0 15.5 13.4 18.2 13.7 15.5 
ea:1 0.9 1.5 2.3 3.8 3.0 5.9 7.6 10.4 5.9 12.5 7.5 12.1 
BALTEX 3.6 4.9 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.0 5.2 3.7 5.2 3.8 6.0 4.2 
BCG , _______ 2.J..._.J.:.t. _____ h°-.. ____ u__ ····--f:~ __ l:..l ______ _i..:.l __ ~o---~~.-hL.--~-6 _2L_ 
TOTAL 
.. -···- .. J~.o -·· I00.0 _______ .199.JL._J!l.O.J _____ J9Jl:.~ ... J90..:..t ····-· J..9~:.9....J.g.Q.:_O ____ JO.!L.lL1Q9.!.Q .. _ 100.0 100.0 
SCllrce: Appemix lable 3 
TABLE 1?. 
TOGO: MARKET SHARES OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. 
DEPOSITS FROM THE GENERAL PUBLIC, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INTFRNATIONAL (NON-FINANCIAL) INSTITUTIONS, 1980 - 1986 
( IN PERCENT) 
---·----(YEAR) 
1980 1981 1982 . ________ 1183/_1~84 t9~Ylm ____ ~ELi~ 
GOVERN- GOVERN- GOVERN- GOVERN- GOVERN- GOVERN-
GENERAL MENT & GENERAL MENT & GENERAL /rlE/ff & GENERAL /rlENT & GENERAL MENT & GENERAL MENT & 
FI NANCI AlJ!IS T li~l!QI!. PUBLIC OTHERS PUBL 1 C __ Qrn~~ ___ _f~B~!C-2.rn~8~ ___ f\!11UL_Qlli~B~--PU.~V C_..Q!tl~~-__ f~!!.~J C OTHERS 
% % % % % % % % % % % % 
C.N.C.A. 6.2 14.2 7.5 9.2 a.o 9.9 5.4 14 .1 5.9 17.6 7. 1 17. 7 
BTO 3.8 1.2 3.4 2.4 3.0 0.0 3.0 2.2 2 .1 2.8 3.5 2.3 
SN!& FA 6.3 13.4 6.6 15.4 4.8 13. 1 5.3 9.8 5.3 7.2 5.8 5.7 
\J.) 
UTB 40.6 49.8 34.5 32.6 27. 1 28.6 30.5 24.7 30.0 24.8 
.i::-30.9 31.3 
BTCI 19.9 3.6 22.2 27. 3 24. 2 30.3 20.1 25.5 18.4 22.6 20.9 16.8 
BIAO-TOGO 15.1 2.6 16.2 3.8 19.7 5.6 20.2 8.0 23.5 10.7 17.6 12.6 
BCCI 2.2 0.0 4. 4 1.8 8.2 4.9 11.8 7.5 10.2 9. 1 9.5 9. 1 
BAL TEX 3.3 14. 7 3.3 5.6 2.5 6. 1 1.9 6.6 2. 1 4.1 2.7 3.3 
BCG 2.5 0.4_ 1.9 1. 8 2.4 1.5 1.8 1.5 2.5 1.2 2.0 1. 1 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 _LOO .0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Appendix Table 4. 
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indicate that the share of the three largest banks in private 
sector deposits (deposits from the general public) decreased from 
76 percent to 70 percent during this period. Their joint share 
in deposits from governments and international non-financial 
institutions increased however, from 56 percent to 61 percent in 
the same period. Since private deposits dominate over other 
deposits (see Appendix Table 4), these changes in market shares 
still represent a small reduction in the dominance of the three 
largest banks in the market. Again, the BCCI shows a striking 
growth in its market share during these six years, going from 2 
percent to 9.5 percent of private deposits, and from zero to 9 
percent of the holdings of government and international non-
f inancial institutions. 
The composition of assets and liabilities of the banking 
system, and the incidence of delinquency in the loan portfolio 
are reported in Table 13 for the period 1981-1986. The two most 
important items in the asset portfolio are reserves and credit to 
non-government clientele, the former growing substantially in 
importance during the period at the expense of all other assets. 
From 6 percent of total assets in 1981, the share of reserves 
increased to about 37 percent in 1986 (see panel A in Table 13). 
As indicated in the preceding chapter, reserves are indeed 
held primarily as deposits at the UMOA's money market, earning 
returns that compete favorably with many other alternative 
3F 
Table 13 
Togo: Composition of Assets and Liabilities of the Banking System, 
and Delinquent Portfolio, 1981 - 1986 
Yea.r 
Portfolio Item 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Percent 
A. Ass•ts 
Reserves 6.2 11. 5 21. 6 32.2 38.4 36.B 
Foreign Assets 16.4 15.2 12.7 11. 4 9.4 7.0 
Credit to 6overn11ent 3.1 2.4 2.1 1. 2 0.4 0.2 
Credit to Non-Government 49.9 45.7 41. 1 32.1 34.8 41. 6 
Other Assets 24.3 25.1 22.s 23.1 17.1 14.5 
Total Assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
B. Liabilities 
Private Sector Deposits 40.3 43.3 46.7 50.0 50.B 55.0 
Government Deposits 7.8 e.o 10.9 12.3 17.4 16.0 
Central Bank Credit 5.5 5.1 4.2 3.4 2.0 1.6 
Foreign Liabilities 18.7 15.1 12.6 12.9 12.7 13.8 
Permanent Funds 9.6 e.o 8.4 7.0 6.6 6.6 
Other Liabilities 18. 1 20.5 17.2 14.3 10.5 7. 1 
Total Liabilities 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
c. Share of Delinquent Loans 
in Credit to Non-Bovern•ent Percent 
Unrepai d Sc Immobilized 4.9 2.5 2.7 3. 1 3.3 2.5 
Doubtful & in Legal Proc. 2.7 6.8 8.1 13.2 8.3 6.4 
Total Ottlinquent 7.7 9.3 10.8 16.3 11. 6 8.9 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: BCEAD, Statistiques econoaiques et aonetaires, various issues. 
Percentages calculated using end-of-December balances for all years, 
excepting 1986 for which October balances were used <most recent 
available data>. 
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allocations~~/. Furthermore, Togo is a net creditor in the UMOA 
money market, while most other member countries are net debtors 
(borrowers) in this market. In practice, this means that private 
deposits in Togo are funding investments in other UMOA countries, 
at an increasing rate over the last five years, and at the 
expense of domestic credit16/. As suggested above, the structure 
of interest rates determined by the BCEAO on the one hand, and 
the risk involved in some lines of domestic credit on the other 
hand, have favored this disguised form of capital flight. 
On the liability side, both private and government deposits 
increased their shares in the banking system's consolidated 
portfolio between 1981 and 1986, while all other liabilities 
decreased their participation (panel Bin Table 13). These 
trends are particularly notorious after 1983. Banks have relied 
increasingly more upon locally mobilized deposits, reducing 
significantly their dependency on the central bank (the BCEAO) 
and foreign borrowing. Indeed, only two banks (the CNCA and the 
BTD) still borrow from the BCEAO, and no private bank has held 
liabilities with the central bank since 1982 l7/. This is clearly 
a healthy trend in the banking system, which contrasts with many 
other developing economies where increasing reliance in central 
15/ Money market deposits represented about 98 percent of 
total reserves in October 1986 (BCEAO, Statistiques economiques 
et monetaires). 
16/ The largest net borrowers at the UMOA money market 
during the period 1984-1986 have been COte d'Ivoire and Senegal 
(BCEAO, Banques et monnaies, October 1986). 
17/ With the exception of small balances at the BCG. 
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bank funding has seriously hindered domestic deposit 
mobilization. 
Panel C in Table 13 shows that the credit portfolio of the 
banking system deteriorated between 1981 and 1984, to recover 
partially in the last two years of the series. As pointed out 
above, this increasing riskiness of domestic credit has 
contributed to a re-allocation of the asset portfolio away from 
domestic lending and towards holdings at the UMOA money market. 
The absence of sanctions associated with the selective credit 
policy has allowed the banks to improve their financial standing 
through sound portfolio management. 
Finally, the composition of the loan portfolio of the 
banking system during the period 1981-1986 is presented in Table 
14, classified by term structure and sector of activity. 
Sectoral shares in total bank credit are summarized in Table 15. 
Short-term credit dominates the loan portfolio of banking 
institutions, even though the share of short-term loans has 
decreased from 75 to 71 percent of total credit between 1981 and 
1986 (see Appendix Table 5). This reduction indeed took place 
after 1983, i.e., once the country started to recover from the 
financial crisis of the early 1980s, and the risk associated with 
the loan portfolio showed signs of reduction. 
Short-term credit is heavily concentrated in the commerce 
sector, which also accounts for a large proportion of total 
medium-term credit (Table 14). Agriculture shows a very small 
share in short-term lending, and larger participation in longer 
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TABLE 14 
TOGO: SECTORAL SHARES IN INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT BY TERM STRUCTURE, 1981 - 1986 
( IN PERCENT ) 
(YEAR) 
TERM STRUCTURE SECTOR 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
% % % % % % 
SHORT TERM AGRICULTURE 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.4 0.9 
MINING 22.2 22.2 9.9 11.3 10.D 25.5 
MANUFACTURING 15.6 16.2 19.7 19.8 10.5 7.5 
ELECTRICITY, GAS, WATER 1.2 0.0 0. 1 2. 1 0.2 0.4 
CONSTR. & PUBLIC WORKS 11.0 9.3 8.8 9.8 11.1 11.3 
TRADE 42.2 U.1 52.3 48.3 57.4 46.6 
TRANSPORTS & COMMUNICATIONS 3.6 3.8 4.4 3.9 5.5 4.5 
INSURANCE & REAL ESTATE 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.7 
SERVICES 1. 7 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.7 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
of which: 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES 57.7 54.4 67.3 67.2 78.2 64.1 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 42.3 45.6 32.7 32.8 21.8 35.9 
MEDIUM TERM AGRICULTURE 4.6 4.2 4.0 4.4 4.0 3.6 
MINING 5.9 2.5 1.3 17.5 16.6 16.3 
MANUFACTURING 32.5 33.7 27.9 18.6 12.2 14.4 
ELECTRICITY, GAS, WATER 10.0 7. 1 5.0 3.9 3.6 2.8 
CONSTR. & PUBLIC WORKS 0.8 2.5 2. 1 1.3 3. 1 2.4 
TRADE 9.7 15 .1 17.8 20.9 25.9 26.1 
TRANSPORTS & COMMUNICATIONS 2.9 2.3 2.3 1.6 1.5 2.6 
INSURANCE & REAL ESTATE 1.6 2.3 5.8 3.9 4.3 3.9 
SERVICES 31.9 30.3 34.8 27.9 28.7 27.9 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
of which: 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES 76. 1 83.5 85.2 72.2 75.1 78.2 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 23.9 16.5 14.8 27.8 24.9 21.8 
LONG TERM AGRICULTURE 11.8 11.2 5.6 5.5 4.7 4.5 
MINING 19.8 15.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
MANUFACTURING 44.5 34.7 36. 7 17.2 11.0 13.6 
ELECTRICITY, GAS, WATER 0.0 13.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
TRADE 6.0 4.7 5.4 5.3 0.4 2. 1 
TRANSPORTS & COMMUNICATIONS 1.5 1.2 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 
INSURANCE & REAL ESTATE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SERVICES 16.3 19.4 50.9 72.0 83.9 79.4 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
of which: 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES 50.5 44.2 74.8 95.8 100.0 100.0 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 49.5 55.8 25.2 4.2 0.0 0.0 
Source: Appendix Table 5. 
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term credit. In all cases however, the share of agriculture has 
decreased during the period under analysis. This decreasing 
trend is clearly shown in Table 15, where the share of the 
primary sector decreases from 2.7 percent of total credit to 1.7 
percent in the five-year period. At the same time, the 
participation of the tertiary sector, primarily commerce, 
increased from 47 percent in 1981 to almost 57 percent in 1986, 
while the secondary sector reduced its share from 50 percent to 
42 percent in the same period. 
The other important trend observed in Tables 14 and 15 is 
the growing participation of private enterprises in total credit 
of the banking system. Lending to private enterprises 
represented 62 percent of the total credit portfolio in 1981, and 
increased to about 67 percent in 1986, having reached a peak of 
almost 78 percent in 1985 (see Table 15). Private firms received 
about 80 percent of medium-term credit, and a growing share of 
long-term credit during this period. Moreover, in the last two 
years of the series all long-term lending went to private firms. 
In summary, the Togolese banking system appears fairly 
strong and developed relative to other developing African 
economies. The banking system relies primarily on domestic 
deposit mobilization as source of liquidity, and allocates most 
of domestic credit to private enterprises. However, the 
incentive structure implicit in the regulations prevailing since 
1980 has induced the banks to allocate an increasing proportion 
of their assets to reserves held as money market deposits at the 
.:1.] 
Table 15 
Togo: Sectoral Shares in Total Institutional Credit, 1981 - 1986 
Vear 
Sector 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Percent 
Primary• 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.4 2.3 1. 7 
Secondary 50.0 47.5 37.8 42.1 32.6 41. 8 
Mining 19.3 17.B 7.7 12.9 11. 9 22.6 
Manufacture 20.0 20.3 21.9 19.4 11. 0 9.4 
Energy & Utilities 3.3 1. 7 1.3 2.b 1.3 1. 0 
Constr.& Public Works 8.4 7.7 7.0 7.3 8.4 B.7 
Terti ary11 47.3 49.9 60.0 55.5 65.1 56.5 
Co1merce 34.0 37.2 43.2 40.0 46.5 40.3 
Transp.& Communic. 3.4 3.4 3.9 3.2 4.2 3.9 
Ins.& Real Estate 0.9 1. 0 2.0 1. 7 2.1 1. 5 
Services 9.0 8.3 10.9 10.6 12.4 10.8 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
of which: 
Private Enterprises 62.0 60.5 71.6 69.0 77.6 68.6 
Public Entreprises 38.0 39.5 28.4 31. 0 22.4 31. 4 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Appendix Table 6. 
a Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry and Fisheries. 
b Excludes government. 
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UMOA. This subt:e form of capital flight has occurred at the 
expense of domestic credit, where the share of agriculture has 
been particularly affected. 
4. RURAL CREDIT OUTSIDE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Since this report considers Togo credit unions (savings and 
loans cooperatives} among the financial institutions, rural 
credit "totally" outside financial institutions is constrained to 
the transactions taking place in the informal market 18 . On the 
other hand, most special programs in agriculture operate their 
credit components through the CNCA, therefore these liquidity 
flows are included in the institutional credit figures discussed 
in previous chapters. However, credit is a minor component (if 
at all) of public investment programs directed to rural 
development, which indeed represent the single most important 
flow of capital into rural areas. 
This chapter reviews first the operations of special 
programs in agriculture and the role of non-financial 
institutions in these programs. As part of this review, public 
investment in rural development is summarily documented and 
analyzed. Second, the chapter discusses the importance of 
informal markets in the provision of financial services to rural 
18 The activities of Togo credit unions are analyzed in 
Chapter 6. 
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households. This discussion is based on the findings of a recent 
study sponsored by the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) and 
the United states Agency for International Development (USAID)l 9 /. 
4.1. Non-financial Institutions and Special Programs in 
Agriculture 
A large number of special projects operate in the rural 
areas of Togo, funded by a dozen foreign donors and Togolese 
counterpart funds. Among the most important programs in 
agricultural production, the following donor agencies stand out: 
the "Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique" (CCCE) and the 
"Fond d'Aide et de Cooperation" (FAC), which support cotton and 
coffee/cocoa programs; the World Bank (WB), also involved in 
coffee/cocoa initiatives; the "Fond Europeen de Developpement" 
(FED), funding crop production in the Savanna region, and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), with 
similar programs in the Kara region; the KFW of Germany provides 
funding for input subsidies. Integrated rural development 
projects are currently being sponsored in several regions of the 
country by the CCCE/FAC, the World Bank and USAID, as well as by 
the GTZ (German cooperation agency), and the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 
Most of the projects indicated above rely upon government 
non-financial institutions for technical assistance, promotion 
19/ Cuevas (1987). 
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and extension, and input delivery201. Three government agencies 
need to be highlighted in this respect: 
(a) The "Direction Generale du Developpement Rural" (DGDR), an 
agency of the Ministry of Rural Developpement, responsible 
for the coordination of implementation, monitoring and 
inspection of all rural development projects. The DGDR is 
represented in each of the five economic regions by a 
regional agency (DRDR), in turn comprised by Sectors 
(prefecture level) and Agencies (sous-prefecture level). 
Most of the technical assistance and credit-related 
activities associated with food crops are performed by 
personnel of the DRDR. 
(b) The "Societe Togolaise du Coton" (SOTOCO), the institution 
in charge of promotion, production support, technical 
assistance, marketing and processing of cotton.£.!/. All loans 
to cotton growers, regardless of the source of funds, are 
processed through and guaranteed by the SOTOCO. 
(c) The "Socilte pour la Renovation et le Developpement des 
Cafeieres et Cacaoyeres Togolaises" (SRCC), a direct 
beneficiary and participant in all projects aimed at the 
improvement of coffee and cocoa plantations. 
~OJ In some cases, the projects set up their own teams to 
perform these functions {e.g., IFAD). 
11.I SOTOCO purchases from cotton producers on behalf of the 
"Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo" (OPAT), whose functions 
are described in detail in the next chapter. 
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The support provided by these government institutions to 
rural development projects represents a substantial subsidy to 
rural areas. As indicated above, the credit component of these 
public investment initiatives is small or non-existent. However, 
the amounts of funding involved in these projects to support 
direct physical investment (e.g., irrigation facilities and 
equipment), technical assistance and training represent large 
inflows of capital in the rural areas that need to be considered 
here. 
Rural development accounted for 30 percent of total public 
investment in the period 1981-1986 (see Appendix Table 7), and is 
expected to represent one-third of the 1987-1989 public 
investment program (World Bank). Public investment in rural 
development between 1981 and 1986 was about 8 times the amount of 
institutional credit allocated to the primary sector (Appendix 
Tables 6 and 7), and shows a steadily growing trend since 1983. 
About three-fourths of total public investment is externally 
funded, under the form of grants or loans to the Togolese 
government. Most of these funds and their domestic counterpart 
are directly invested in rural infrastructure (e.g, the Nangbeto 
dam), or institutional support (notably the SRCC). The payments 
to local resources originated by these projects represent a 
substantial amount of liquidity flowing into rural areas, and 
therefore an important potential demand for financial services. 
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4.2. Informal Finance in Rural Areas 
This section relies upon the findings of a recent household 
survey undertaken in rural areas of Togo, as part of a 
WOCCU/USAID study of Togo credit unions. Some 400 interviews 
were carried out in about 40 rural villages in different regions 
of the country. The sample was designed so that about one-half 
of the respondents were members of credit unions (Coopecs), and 
the other half were rural households of comparable income levels 
and activity (see Cuevas, 1987). The major findings reported in 
this study in reference to the importance of informal finance, as 
compared to institutional finance, are summarized below. 
Access to Credit 
A large proportion of the respondents had obtained at least 
one JEformal loan in the year preceding the date of the inter-
view. As shown in Table 16, ftO percent of all households in the 
sample received a loan from an informal source. These figures 
represent a lower-bound estimate of access to informal sources of 
funds, since they consider only the most important loan received 
by the respondent during the year. In fact, about 10 percent of 
the households had received loans from more than one source. 
Overall, relatives were the most important source of 
assistance (48 percent of all loans received), whereas traders 
were the suppliers of funding in about one-fourth of the cases. 
Moneylenders w1:re the source of an informal loan in less than 12 
percent of the cases, even though about 40 percent of the 
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respondents acknowledged the existence of moneylenders in the 
village. 
The most important form of informal loans was cash (65 
percent of the cases), followed by grains and other consumer 
goods (18 percent). Consumer credit from retailers was the form 
of informal borrowing in almost 10 percent of the cases. No 
major differences were observed between members and non-members 
of credit unions in terms of the form taken by informal loans or 
assistance. 
On the other hand, the households in the sample (389) had 
received a total of 310 institutional loans in the last 5 years, 
i.e., an average of 62 loans per year for 389 households. This 
gives an overall rate of access to institutional loans of 15.9 
percent. In other words, about 16 percent of the rural 
households can expect to obtain an institutional loan each year. 
A similar exercise gives a rate of access for Coopec members of 
27.3 percent {272 loans in 5 years for 199 households), and only 
4 percent for non-members of Coopecs (38 loans in 5 years for 190 
households). Thus one of the major contributions of the credit-
union organization stands out here, namely a substantially 
improved access to institutional credit for the members. 
A summary of the findings related to access to institutional 
and non-institutional credit is presented in Table 17. Overall, 
as expected, rural households have more access to informal loans 
than they have to institutional credit. However, the amounts 
borrowed from informal sources are on average about one-third of 
Table 16 
Togo: Informal Borrowing by Rural Households, Members and 
Non-Members of COOPECs, by Source of the Loan 
Source of COOPEC Members Non-Members Total 
Inf orul Loan 
Number Nuaber 
Relatives 41 46.6 34 49.3 75 47.B 
Friends Si neighbors 9 10.2 10 14.5 19 12. 1 
Traders 22 25.0 16 23.2 38 24.2 
Moneylenders 12 13.b 6 8.7 18 11. 5 
Other 4 4.6 3 4.4 7 4.5 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 88 100.0 69 100.0 157 100.0 
Percent of total sample 44.2X 36.3X 40.4X 
Source: Cuevas (1987). 
Table 17 
Togo: Access to Institutional and Non-Institutional Credit. A Summary 
Institutional Credit Inf or•al Loans 
Sub-sup le 
Percent of Average Percent of Average 
Households Loan Aaount Households Loan Aaount 
per year FCFA per year FCFA 
COOPEC Members 27. 3X 60,591 44.21 44,781 
Non-Members of 4.0X 318,749 36.31. 20,826 
COOPECs ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sample• 15.91. 84,526 40.4% 33,852 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Cuevas <1987). 
• Neighted averages • 
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the amounts borrowed from institutions. An striking contrast 
observed in Table 17 is in the average amounts of loans borrowed 
by members vis a vis non-members of credit unions, the latter 
being about five times as large as the former. It is clear from 
these figures that the few loans received by non-members of 
credit unions are heavily concentrated in loans of very large 
amounts, whereas most Coopec loans are of smaller amounts. 
The "expected value" of institutional credit for Coopec 
members would be 16,541 FCFA, i.e., the average loan amount 
(60,591 FCFA) times the rate of access (27.3 percent) which can 
be interpreted as the probability of obtaining a loan in a given 
year. A similar exercise with the informal-loans figures for 
Coopec members in Table 17 gives an "expected value" of informal 
credit of 19,793 FCFA. This is still higher than the amount 
obtained for institutional credit, but it brings the incidence of 
institutional credit for Coopec members to about 46 percent of 
the total "expected" borrowing from all sources 221. 
An interesting exercise with the figures reported in Table 
17 involves considering the total amount of liquidity likely to 
be borrowed in a given year by members versus non-members of 
Coopecs, and relate these amounts to the average gross income 
reported for each group in the study referred to above. Total 
(expected) borrowing is obtained adding up the expected values of 
22/ This incidence is almost four times as high as that 
found in the rural areas of Niger for example, where there is no 
credit-union network, and institutional credit relies upon the 
CNCA input delivery system. 
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institutional plus non-institutional loans calculated as 
indicated above. This amount averages 36,334 FCFA in the case of 
Coopec members, which represents seven percent of average gross 
household income in this group. The same calculation with the 
figures reported for non-members gives an average (expected) 
total borrowing of 20,310 FCFA per year for this sub-sample, or 
4.4 percent of their average gross household income. 
Access to Deposit Services and Other Uses of Liquidity 
The WOCCU/USAID survey found that members of Coopecs and 
non-members of Coopecs showed similar access to traditional forms 
of financial savings (adakavi, tontine, caisses collectives, yes-
yes). Overall, about 16 percent of the respondents acknowledged 
participating at some form of non-institutional savings group or 
scheme. Use of these forms of savings was more frequent among 
Coopec members (19 percent of the cases) than among non-members 
of Coopecs (14 percent of the households). This is an 
interesting finding because it implies that the credit-union 
organization does not indeed substitutes for traditional forms of 
savings, but instead represents an addition to the existing 
informal savings groups, therefore it represents a net 
improvement in the availability of deposit services. 
Among the traditional forms of savings in which the 
households participate, the tontine was the most common (70 
percent of those participating in non-institutional savings 
schemes). Adakavis and "yes-yes" accounted each for about 11 
51 
percent of the cases of informal savings. The average amount 
deposited {or contributed) to these traditional organizations was 
about 1,300 FCFA per participant. 
Informal lending or the provision of assistance to others 
was found to be a widespread practice in the sample under 
analysis. Forty-three percent of the respondents in the sample 
indicated having supplied a loan or some form of assistance to 
others in the 12-month period preceding the interview. This 
proportion was almost 50 percent among members of Coopecs, and 
reached about 37 percent among non-members of Coopecs. 
The amounts involved in informal lending {primarily in cash) 
are reported in Table 18. Loans granted by Coopec members were 
larger than average, and they also show a larger dispersion than 
those supplied by non-members. The higher frequency of informal 
lending observed among Coopec members, and the larger average 
amounts lent, suggest that an important degree of liquidity 
circulation takes place through credit union members. In other 
words, their improved access to sources of funds associated with 
their participation in the Coopecs allows them to become, in 
turn, a source of liquidity to other members of the rural 
community. 
The provision of deposit services to the rural population 
stands out here as the major contribution of a credit-union 
network. Table 19 shows the striking differences between Coopec 
members and non-members of Coopecs in this respect. The vast 
majority of Coopec members (98 percent) indicated holding 
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Table 18 
Togo: Informal Lending. Amounts Lent by COOPEC Members and by 
Non-Members of COOPECs in the Year Preceding the IntervieN 
Sub-sample 
CDDPEC Members 
Non-Members of 
COOPECs 
Total Suple 
N 
7B 
55 
133 
Source: Cuevas (1987). 
Amount Lent, FCFA 
Mean Minimum Haxiaum 
27,273 60 320,000 
20,695 BOO 312,000 
24,553 60 320,000 
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Table 19 
Togo: Institutional Savings. Access to Depository Institutions 
by Rural Households, Members and Non-Members of COOPECs 
Institution 
COOPEC <onlyl 
Caisse d'Epargne 
CNCA 
Banks and other 
depository inst. 
None 
Sub-saaple 
COOPEC Hubers 
Number 
175 90.7 
6• 3.1 
B• 4.2 
1 0.5 
3 1.6 
Non-He111bers 
of COOPECs 
Nu ab er 
2 1. 1 
Sb 4.4 
15• B.2 
7 3.8 
151 82.5 
Total Suple 
Number 
177 47.1 
14 3.7 
23 6.1 
B 2. 1 
154 41.0 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sample 193 100.0 183 100.0 376 100.0 
Source: Cuevas (1987>. 
.. 
b 
" 
Accounts held in addition to a CODPEC account • 
Includes 3 cases of accounts being held both at the Caisse d'Epargne and 
at other banks. 
Includes 1 case of accounts being held both at the CNCA and at the Caisse 
d'Epargne. 
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deposits at institutions, whereas only 17 percent did so among 
non-members of Coopecs. The presence of the Coopec explains 91 
percent of the access of Coopec members to institutional savings. 
Another important feature of the effect of Coopecs on the 
community is highlighted in Table 20. Average amounts of deposit 
transactions as well as average amounts of deposit balances 
appear clearly smaller for Coopec members than among non-members. 
The difference is particularly striking in the case of deposit 
transactions. These contrasts illustrate the fact that Coopecs 
tend to make deposit services available to small depositors, 
i.e., households that ordinarily would not have access to, or 
would not be appealing as clients for, other depository institu-
tions. 
In summary, this section has shown that informal finance 
plays an important role in the rural areas of Togo. Informal 
borrowing, participation in traditional savings organizations, 
and informal lending are activities carried out by a significant 
proportion of the rural population. The presence of credit 
unions (Coopecs) involves a net addition to the supply of 
financial services, credit and deposits, in the rural community. 
Coopec members benefit from substantially improved access to 
institutional loans and deposit services as compared to non-
members of Coopecs, in addition to enjoying comparable or better 
access to the tradjtional forms of informal credit and informal 
savings. Furthermore, Coopec members contribute to increase 
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Table 20 
Togo: Institutional Savings. Average Amounts of Deposit 
Transactions Hade and Deposit Balances Held by Rural 
Households, Members and Non-Hembers of COOPECs 
Average Amounts in FCFA• 
Deposit Transactions Deposit Balances 
Sub-sample 
COOPEC Members 
Non-Hetnbers of 
COOPECs 
Total Sample 
Minimum 
4,457 
38,386 
8,698 
Source: Cuevas (1987). 
Maxi •um Minimum 
13,182 19,635 
93,871 
22,863 29,809 
& Extreme values for the year preceding the date of the 
interview. 
Haxi•um 
32,235 
174,418 
51,486 
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liquidity circulation, and represent a source of informal loans 
to other households in rural areas. 
5. INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRICING POLICIES 
Three ministries are involved in rural development in Togo: 
(i), the Ministry of Planning and Industry is responsible for the 
preparation and evaluation of public investment projects in the 
area; {ii), the Ministry of Rural Infrastructure Development is 
in charge of public works in rural areas, equipment management, 
environmental protection and land reform, and (iii), the Ministry 
of Rural Development is responsible for the coordination of 
agricultural production activities, extension services, 
agricultural research, and cooperatives. 
Most coordination, monitoring and extension functions of the 
Ministry of Rural Development are executed through the "Direction 
Generale du Developpement Rural" (DGDR}, whose role in rural 
development projects was described in the preceding chapter. The 
'Direction des Enquetes et Statistiques Agricoles" (DESA}, a 
division of the DGDR, is in charge of collection of agricultural 
production and price statistics. 
Two important para-statals under the Ministry of Rural 
Development were also dealt with in reference to their role in 
public investment projects: the SOTOCO, in charge of cotton 
production programs, and the SRCC, with similar functions in 
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cocoa and coffee (see Chapter 4). The two key marketing para-
statals, the "Office National des Produits Vivriers" (TOGOGRAIN), 
and the "Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo" (OPAT) are 
considered with some detail below, along with a discussion of 
agricultural pricing policies. The other para-statals under the 
Ministry of Rural Development are the "Societe Nationale pour les 
Palmeriae a Huile" (SONAPH), in charge of processing oil-palm 
products, and the "Office de Developpement et 'Exploitation 
Forestiere" (ODEF), responsible for forestry development. 
Finally, food crop research in Togo has been conducted 
primarily by IRAT, the french institute, under special agreements 
with the Togolese government. Similar agreements have operated 
for research on cotton, coffee and cocoa. The DGDR, expected to 
coordinate agricultural research efforts, lacks the appropriately 
skilled staff to perform this function (World Bank). Likewise, 
insufficient resources have constrained the extension efforts of 
the regional agencies (DRDRs), forcing some special investment 
projects to operate their own extension and technical assistance 
programs. Attention is being given to improving the structure of 
the DGDR and its regional agencies (World Bank). 
5.1. Marketing and Prices of Food Crops23/ 
Food crops are freely marketed through private channels in 
Togo. Almost all private market agents of food crops are women. 
23/ Part of the information discussed in this section was 
extracted from World Bank, "Country Economic Memorandum" 
(February 1987), and personal interviews at TOGOGRAIN. 
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Private traders account for all transactions of yams and manioc, 
and most of grain trade. Most marketed production is traded 
locally, and varies considerably in quantity between crop seasons 
depending on the amount of rainfall. As a result, price 
fluctuations can be substantial from one year to the next. 
Moreover, lack of storage facilities at the farm level contribute 
to create wide price differentials within the crop cycle. 
Producer prices of food crops are reported in nominal and 
real terms in Table 21 for the last six years. With the 
exception of rice, an irrigated crop that does not depend on 
rainfall, prices of all crops show a decreasing trend in recent 
years. Particularly striking is the price drop observed in 1985, 
a year of good rainfall following several dry years. Hence, good 
climatic years have not necessarily represented years of improved 
revenues for Togolese farmers. 
TOGOGRAIN is the official government para-statal in charge 
of grain marketing, operating with 118 employees in 9 regional 
centers. Usable warehouse capacity of TOGOGRAIN is estimated at 
15 thousand metric tons (World Bank), which represent less than 5 
percent of average annual grain production. Substantial 
operating deficits incurred by TOGOGRAIN in past market 
interventions induced the government to restrict the agency's 
activity to the maintenance of small buffer stocks of cereals. 
In fact, the value of grain purchases by TOGOGRAIN decreased by 
15 percent between 1982 and 1984, and was only partially restored 
in 1985 in an attempt to control the fall in prices due to that 
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Table 21 
Togo: Producer Prices of Food Crops in Nominal and Real Teras, 
1981 - 1986 
Year 
Crop 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
A. Current FCFA/kila 
Yams 78 83 89 81 63 
Manioc <cassava> 41 38 35 38 30 
Maize 96 100 104 75 48 
Sorghum/Millet 84 97 111 89 64 
Kidney beans 179 210 242 176 128 
Rice <paddy> 87 99 110 97 104 
8. Canst ant FCFA 1980/lcila• 
Vaas 65 62 61 58 46 
Hanioc <cassava> 34 29 24 27 22 
Ha he BO 75 71 53 35 
Sorghum/Mil let 70 73 76 63 46 
Kidney beans 150 158 166 125 93 
Rice (paddy) 73 74 76 69 75 
1986 
69 
33 
7l 
68 
143 
126 
48 
23 
49 
47 
99 
87 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Direction des Enquetes et Statistiques Agricoles <DESA>, and 
Mission Francaise de Cooperation. 
a Deflated by the CPI African families. 
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year's bumper crop. At present, the buffer stock maintained by 
TOGOGRAIN is not supposed to exceed 12 thousand tons, and the 
agency is studying a reduction in the number of regional centers 
and personnel. 
With adequate rainfall, Togo is capable of attaining self-
sufficiency in food crops and even generate some surplus. 
However, producers had not been able to sell in the regional 
market in West Africa since private exports were prohibited until 
1985. Aside from "unofficial" exports to Burkina Faso and Niger, 
including some re-exports of Ghanaian maize, private traders did 
not have access to the large regional markets, notably Nigeria. 
Then in 1986, the Government lifted the prohibition on exports of 
food crops and implemented the issuance of export licenses, as 
part of the policy measures undertaken under the Structural 
Adjustment Program with the World Bank. Other recent policy 
measures adopted to improve food-crop marketing are the creation 
of an early warning mechanism for food shortages at the Ministry 
of Rural Development, and the promotion of village marketing 
associations. Incentives to create these associations and 
improve local storage capacity will be funded by USAID grants to 
the Government. 
5.2. Marketing and Prices of Cash Crops 
Cocoa, coffee and cotton are Togo's major export crops. 
Peanuts, karite and palmistes (palm kernels) are of less 
significance in terms of value of production and export revenues. 
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Cocoa and coffee are grown in the highlands region of Togo, where 
production has been declining (cocoa) or rather stagnant (coffee) 
due to the aging of plantations. An effort to renovate these 
plantations is under the responsibility of the SRCC, with support 
from the World Bank, the CCCE, and the FAC. 
On the other hand, cotton has had striking success as a 
rather new cash crop in the country. Production of cotton 
tripled in the past six years, due to increases in both area and 
yields. This success is largely attributed to the efforts of the 
SOTOCO, which has provided credit, subsidies, and technical 
assistance to cotton growers, also with the support of the World 
Bank, the CCCE and the FAC (World Bank). 
Export-crop purchases and exports are undertaken exclusively 
by the OPAT, the state marketing board. Purchases of cocoa and 
coffee, as well as karite and peanuts are performed through 
registered private traders ("acheteur agree"), whereas cotton is 
bought through SOTOCO at the processing plant. Oil-palm products 
on the other hand are purchased through the SONAPH, the state 
enterprise for processing palm products. The OPAT provides 
financing to the registered purchasers, and subsidizes the 
operations of the SOTOCO. 
Unlike food crops, producer prices of cash crops have grown 
in nominal an real terms since 1983 (see Table 22), in spite of a 
decrease in world prices experienced in 1986. Producer prices of 
the three main export crops have increased steadily over the last 
three years. However, only cotton has been able to react to 
Crop 
6/ 
Table 22 
Togo: Producer Prices of Cash Crops in Nominal and Real Terms, 
1981 - 1986 
Year 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1996 
A. Current FCFA/kilo 
Cocoa 220 225 235 275 300 330 
Coffee 200 215 235 290 315 365 
Cotton 60 65 65 75 90 105 
Karih 41 41 45 55 65 80 
Pah kernels 52 52 55 60 75 75 
Peanuts (husked) 85 95 105 145 175 175 
8. Constant FCFA 1980/kllo• 
Cocoa 184 169 162 196 218 228 
Coffee 1b7 162 162 207 229 253 
Cotton 50 49 45 53 65 73 
Kari te 34 31 31 39 47 55 
Palm kernels 43 39 39 43 54 52 
Peanuts <husked) 71 71 72 103 127 121 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OPAT. 
a Deflated by the CPI African families. 
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the$e and other incentives (e.g., production subsidies), since 
cocoa trees and coffee trees require several years to begin 
production. More importantly, export crops have been used 
primarily as a source of government revenues through export taxes 
and OPAT margins, a role that conflicts with providing better 
price incentives to the producers of these crops. 
As shown in Table 23, producers received less than 40 
percent of the export price of cocoa and cotton, and less than 30 
percent in the case of coffee, during the period 1983-198524 /. An 
exception was the year 1986, when unexpected reductions in world 
prices had to be absorbed by the OPAT, at a loss in the case of 
cotton. In the preceding years however, the OPAT perceived 
substantial export margins, subsequently "channeled into the 
Government's budget" (World Bank), in addition to the export 
taxes collected during the marketing process (see Table 23). 
Export taxes and OPAT margins on export crops represent 
between 8 and 10 percent of government revenues. "By setting the 
level of OPAT contribution to the budget before it sets producer 
prices, the Government has long prevented the latter from rising 
to levels that would give clear incentives to production" (World 
Bank). Until recent years, the Government's policy was to 
maintain producer prices relatively constant in real terms. 
Hence, to protect itself against the need to lower prices in 
response to reductions in world prices, it tended to keep 
24/ This assumes that producers are effectively paid the 
official producer price. 
Table 23 
Togo: Export Pricts and "arketing ft1rgins in "8jor Export Craps, 1'83 - 1986 
-------------------------------------------------------------------·--------------------------
Yur 
Crop 198~ 1984 19~ 1!86 
FCFA/ 1 of FCFA/ 1 of FCFA/ 1 of FCFAJ % of 
kilo Ex.Price kilo Ex.Price kilo Ex.Price kilo Ex.Price 
-----..----------------------------------------·-----------------------------------------------
Cac:111 
Export price IFOB> 603 100.0 984 100.0 1017 100.0 733 100.0 
<->Export 11rgin OPAT 269 44.6 601 61.1 603 59.3 282 38.5 
Export cost 334 55.4 383 38.9 414 40.7 451 61.5 
<-JOPAT casts•taxes• 72 11.9 80 8.1 84 8.3 90 12.3 
llhalnale price 262 43.4 303 30.8 330 32.4 361 49.2 
<-Jtlirketing 1argin 27 4.5 28 2.8 30 2.9 31 4.2 
Producer prict 235 39.0 275 27.9 300 29.5 330 45.0 
Coff• 
Export price <FOB> 835 100.0 1167 100.0 1188 100.0 1023 100.0 
(-)Export 1argin OPAT 466 55.8 731 62.6 718 60.4 491 48.0 
Export cost 369 44.2 436 37.4 470 39.6 532 52.0 
C-IOPAT costs•taxes• 107 12.8 116 9.9 123 10.4 133 13.0 
llholesal1 price 262 ll.4 320 27.4 347 29.2 399 39.0 
<-lft1rk1tin9 11rgin 27 l.2 30 2.6 32 2.7 34 3.3 
Producer price 235 28.1 290 24.9 315 26.5 365 35.7 
Cotlaa 
Export pric1 fFOB> 553 100.0 617 100.0 584 100.0 337 100.0 
<->Export 11r9in DPAT 224 40.5 122 19,8 81 13.9 -60 -17.8 
Export cost 329 59.5 495 80.2 503 86. l 397 117.8 
C-)IJPAT coststitaxes• 38 6.9 52 8.4 53 9.1 45 13.4 
llhalesale price 291 52.6 443 71.8 450 n.1 352 104.5 
(-)"-rketing aargin 132 23.9 260 42.1 233 39.9 102 30.3 
Producer pric.- 159 28.S 183 29.7 217 37.2 250 74.2 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Saurc11 Based an prices repartld by OPAT and llorld B1nk. 
a Includes export taxe1. 
b Price equivalent adjusted by yield in fi!Jlr. 
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producer prices at a low percentage of the export (FOB} price. 
The steady increase in producer prices in real terms after 1983 
documented in Table 22 is reflecting a tendency to move away from 
this emphasis on government revenues, towards a policy that would 
favor the farmers. Future policy is intended to pass on a larger 
proportion of the world price to the producers, while reducing 
subsidies on inputs and exploring alternative ways of collecting 
government revenues from export crops. 
6. KEY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND AN OVERVIEW OF RURAL FINANCE 
This final chapter reviews the activities and performance of 
three financial institutions of primary importance in the rural 
areas of Togo. First, the "Caisse Nationale de CrAdit Agricole" 
(CNCA) is the major single supplier of agricultural credit in the 
country, providing about two-thirds of production credit granted 
by the banking system, and almost 80 percent of credit for 
marketing of agricultural products 25/. Second, the "Caisse 
d'Epargne du Togo" (CET) offers deposit services in the rural 
areas through the post-office network, and represents along with 
the branches of the commercial banks a major channel for 
liquidity transfers from rural areas to urban centers. 
The third "institution'' analyzed in this chapter is the 
credit-union network organized around the "Federation des Unions 
25/ Based on figures reported by the CNCA for 1985. 
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Cooperatives d'Epargne et de Credit" (FUCEC). This fast-growing 
movement represents a promising alternative for the development 
of rural financial markets in Togo. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a summary overview of the current state of rural 
finance in the country, and an assessment of the prospects for 
the future. 
6.1. The "Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole", CNCA 
Created in 1967, the CNCA is a public institution 
responsible for all operations that can foster the development of 
agriculture, rural handicrafts and fisheries, including the 
marketing of their products. The Togolese State holds 400 
million FCFA of the 1.1 billion FCFA total paid capital of the 
institution. The other shareholders are four public institutions 
which hold together 425 million FCFA26/, the BCEAO with 200 
million, and the CNCA-France with 75 million FCFA of paid 
capital. 
The CNCA operates 18 permanent branches (9 regional offices 
and 9 local branches) and 23 periodic (mobile) offices. Fifteen 
of the permanent branches and all of the periodic off ices are 
located outside of Lome. Total bank personnel in 1985 was 281 
employees, 30 percent of them working at the central off ice in 
Lome. About a percent of the total number of employees were 
26/ These shareholders are the Office des Produits Agricoles 
du Togo (OPAT), the "Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale" 
(CNSS), the "Banque Togolaise de Developpement" {BTD), and the 
"Societe Nationale d'Investissements" (SNI). 
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classified as high-level staff in 1985, almost 70 percent as 
middle management, and the remaining 22 percent as auxiliary 
service personnel. With these resources. the CNCA provides 
services to about 50 thousand depositors, and some 45 thousand 
borrower clients, of which 25 thousand are agricultural producers 
(Bergougniou)27/. 
Credit operations are coordinated with personnel of the DRDR 
for food crops and cotton, the SOTOCO for cotton, the SRCC for 
cocoa and coffee loans, and with personnel of the special 
projects in other development initiatives (e.g., the IFAD project 
in Notse). Deposit mobilization activities are undertaken 
primarily by CNCA personnel, but some current initiatives involve 
non-government organizations, and personnel of integrated 
development projects. 
Operations have been gradually computerized in recent years 
at the head office and at the regional branches, along with 
several training programs for the personnel. Important 
reorganization efforts are being undertaken to improve record 
keeping, rationalize accounting practices, and improve loan 
recovery, a critical problem in the CNCA. The issue of loan 
delinquency, and the major adjustments undertaken in the 
accounting system to face the problem are discussed further 
below. 
27/ Market shares of the CNCA in loans, total assets, and 
deposits were shown in Chapter 4 (see Tables 11 and 12). 
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Liabilities and Capital 
The behavior of the different components of the liability 
portfolio is described in Table 24, excluding current profits 
(losses). It is clear in this table that deposits have been the 
predominant source of funds for the CNCA, particularly after 
1984. Deposits represented, on average, 62 percent of total 
liabilities in the period 1983-1986, having increased from 58 
percent to over 67 percent of the liability portfolio during this 
time period. Almost 60 percent of these deposits correspond to 
private savings, while about 40 percent are accounts held by 
government institutions (see Chapter 4, and Appendix Table 4). 
On the other hand, savings accounts and time deposits comprise 
about 60 percent of the deposit portfolio. Appendix Table 8 
shows that the composition of this portfolio has been relatively 
stable over the last four years, with a growing trend in the 
share of time deposits at the expense of current accounts held by 
institutions. 
The increasing importance of deposits in the liability 
portfolio and, to a lesser extent, of the share of lines of 
credit, has substituted for borrowing from the central bank, 
i.e., the BCEAO. In fact, the share of rediscount funds in the 
liability portfolio decreased from 20 percent in 1984 to less 
than 9 percent in 1986 (see Table 24). This is an important 
contrast with the trend observed in other CNCAs in West Africa, 
and other development banks in less-developed economies, where 
increasing dependency on central-bank rediscount appears to be 
Table 24 
CNCA-Togo: Selected Liabilities. Composition at Year ind and 
Annual Rates of Change, 1983 - 1986 
Portfolio ItH 1983 
Central Bank 15.0 
Deposits 58.5 
Banks & correspondents 0.8 
Lines of credit 12.5 
Subsidies 0.1 
Capital 10. 1 
Other• 3. 1 
Total" 100.0 
Central Bank 
Deposits 
Banks & corrnp. 
Lines of credit 
Subsidies 
Capital 
Other 
Total 
Year 
1984 1985 
Average 
1986 1983-1986 
Perc•ntage Co•position 
20.2 5.8 8.9 12.5 
53.3 68.1 67.1 61.8 
t. 7 1.2 0.7 1. l 
11.9 16.7 15.1 14.1 
o. 1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
9.2 4.3 1. 0 6.1 
3.5 3.7 7.1 4.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Rates of ChanQ•, Percent per Year 
57.4 -70.3 107.3 31.5 
6.2 32.2 33.3 23,9 
160.2 -26.9 -27.7 35.2 
11. 0 44.5 22.7 26.0 
128.6 o.o -12.5 38.7 
6.1 -51.4 -69.4 -38.2 
34.0 9.6 158.4 67.3 
16.6 3.4 35.3 18.4 
Source: Based on CNCA records. Accounting year ends on Septe•ber 30. 
a Includes miscellaneous provisions introduced in 1996. 
b Excludes profits <losses). 
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widespread. Also, given the structure of interest rates set by 
the BCEAO (see Chapter 2), a shift towards a portfolio based more 
on deposits and less on central bank rediscount is a step in the 
right direction. 
External lines of credit accounted for about 14 percent of 
total liabilities in the period 1983-1986, showing an important 
increase in 1985 {see Table 24). Major sources of external funds 
for the CNCA are the World Bank, the "Caisse Centrale de 
Cooperation Economique" (CCCE) and the "Fond Europeen de 
Developpement" {FED). These funds are for the most part targeted 
to cocoa, coffee, and cotton loans. 
Finally, another important result observed in Table 24 is 
the declining share of capital in total liabilities. This is 
primarily a result of the increasing amount of provisions for 
loan default made in recent years, and the consequent operational 
losses registered in the accounts. Hence, the financial 
indicators analyzed later in this section show unusually negative 
net returns to capital, even though the increase in provisions 
was a sound and realistic adjustment in accounting practices. 
Asset Portfolio 
The composition of CNCA's financial assets and the 
performance of its different components in the period 1983-1986 
are summarized in Table 252 8/. Overall, financial assets grew at 
·------------
28/ Fixed assets have represented a steady 3 percent of the 
total assets portfolio, therefore the discussion in this section 
focuses in the performance of financial assets. 
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Table 25 
CNCA-Togo: Financial Assets. Coapos1tion at Year End and 
Annual Rates of Change, 1983 - 1986 
Portfolio itn 
1983 
Liquid assets 1.0 
Banks & correspondents 4.0 
Short-term Loans 37.0 
Hediu•-ter• Loans 35.3 
Doubtful loans 
l.!.ll. provi si ans 18.4 
Other financial assets 4.3 
Total 100.0 
Liqu1 d assets 
Banks & correspondents 
Short-ter• Loans 
Hed1um-ter• Loans 
Doubtful loans 
1 ess provi si ans 
Other financial assets 
Total 
Year 
1984 1985 
Average 
1986 1983-1986 
Percentage Caaposition 
2.3 2.9 9.4 3.9 
2.8 2.1 12.6 5.4 
42.4 48.8 40.1 42.l 
25.5 22.6 18.1 25.4 
23.6 20.4 7.0 17.3 
3.3 3.2 12.7 5.9 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Rates of Change, Percent per Year 
153.0 30.1 237.4 140.2 
-23.2 -19.2 507.7 155.1 
26.3 21.2 -15.2 10.8 
-20.4 -6.6 -17.2 -14.7 
41.1 -9.2 -64.B -11.0 
-15.0 -0.7 314.7 99.7 
10.1 5.2 3.2 6.2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Based on CNCA records. Accounting year ends on Septe•ber 30. 
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an average annual rate of 6.2 percent with a declining trend in 
the annual growth rate since 1984. Almost 70 percent of the 
financial assets is accounted for by short and medium term loans. 
This share shows a reduction in 1986 to about 60 percent of the 
portfolio, compensated by increases in the participation of 
liquid assets and other miscellaneous financial assets. 
The slow-down in the growth of financial assets in the last 
two years, and the changes observed in its composition respond to 
important adjustments made in accounting practices and management 
of the CNCA in this period. A more realistic and drastic policy 
of loan classification has substantially increased the amounts of 
doubtful loans in the portfolio, while at the same time larger 
and more appropriate provisions for loan losses have been made in 
the books. These adjustments are reflected in the declining 
share of doubtful loans less provisions observed in Table 25, and 
in the more detailed account presented in Table 26. 
Doubtful loans went from 38 percent of total loans 
outstanding in 1983 to 52 percent in 1986 (see Table 26). At the 
same time, provisions for these doubtful loans increased from 
less than one-third in 1983 to 86 percent of doubtful balances in 
1986. Similar adjustments were made in both short-term and 
medium-term loans, and in all sectors of destination. 
Particularly striking was the increase in provisions for short-
term marketing loans, classified as near-100 percent doubtful 
until 1985. These corresponded to large balances accumulated by 
the SOTOCO and a group of private marketing companies organized 
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Table 26 
CNCA-Togo1 Loans Outstanding, Doubtful Loans •nd Provisions, by 
Term Structure and Sector of Destination, 1983 - 1986 
Total Portfolio 
Outstanding, million FCFA 
Doubtful, % of outstanding 
Provisions, X of doubtful 
Short-ter• 
Outstanding, •illion FCFA 
Doubtful, % of outstanding 
Provisions, X of doubtful 
Agriculture, •illion FCFA 
Doubtful, X of outstanding 
Provisions, % of doubtful 
Marketing, aillion FCFA 
Doubtful, % of outstanding 
Provisions, X of doubtful 
Non-Agriculture, million FCFA 
Doubtful, X of outstanding 
Provisions, X of doubtful 
Overdrafts, •illion FCFA 
Doubtful, % of outstanding 
Provisions 
Letters of credit, million FCFA 
Doubtful, X of outstanding 
Provisions, X of doubtful 
Hediu.-ter• 
Outstanding, •illion FCFA 
Doubtful, l of outstanding 
Provisions, X of doubtful 
Agriculture, million FCFA 
Doubtful, X of outst•nding 
Provisions, % of doubtful 
Non-Agriculture, •illion FCFA 
Doubtful, l of outstanding 
Provisions, X of doubtful 
Source1 Based on CNCA records. 
1983 
10556.0 
37.B 
31.4 
7327.7 
46.0 
34.5 
915.6 
39.3 
30.2 
2079.S 
96.4 
26.7 
2494.7 
8.2 
44.0 
748.8 
24.4 
14.3 
1088.7 
56.6 
65.3 
3228.3 
19.4 
15.0 
1961. 9 
26.7 
16.9 
12416.5 
e.o 
5.5 
Vear 
1984 1985 
13893.7 
45.4 
37.3 
9052.3 
44.5 
44.4 
1050.6 
40.9 
35.3 
1955.1 
99.9 
48.0 
2802.9 
B.8 
45.B 
1376.0 
41.1 
10.7 
1867.7 
44.4 
63.4 
4841.3 
47.2 
24.6 
3503.2 
58.4 
25.7 
1338.1 
18.0 
16.0 
15361. 7 
48.6 
41.5 
10237.5 
49.S 
43.2 
1301.9 
38.7 
42.3 
1335.0 
100.0 
70.6 
3407.3 
9.2 
48.9 
1839. e 
60.S 
21. 8 
2353.8 
78.1 
35.b 
5124.2 
46.2 
37.9 
3917.5 
:U.9 
38.8 
1206.6 
27.S 
32.0 
1986 
16142.8 
52.0 
86.0 
10883.3 
51. 7 
BB.1 
1463.9 
62.3 
69.2 
1916. 5 
76.4 
100.0 
3451.B 
16.5 
83.4 
1380.2 
71. 0 
90.0 
2670.9 
63.6 
BB.15 
5259.5 
52.B 
91.6 
3803.9 
58.9 
Sl.4 
1455.6 
37.1 
82.4 
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as the "Societe Togolaise de Commercialisation de Produits 
Agricoles" (STCP). 
Agricultural (production) loans account for about one-third 
of CNCA's outstanding portfolio. This share increases to almost 
45 percent if marketing loans are included as agricultural 
credit. Indeed, the CNCA is the only bank, public or private, 
that complies with the selective credit policy of the National 
Credit Committee, allocating funds to agriculture well beyond the 
established targets 29/. This compliance represents an important 
cost for the bank in terms of delinquency in the loan portfolio. 
As seen in Table 26, non-agricultural loans are by far the least 
problematic use of loanable funds, even after the drastic 
adjustments in loan classification and accounting provisions 
applied in 1986. 
Financial Performance 
As indicated earlier, the CNCA has experienced important 
reductions in capital between 1983 and 1986 due to loan recovery 
problems and financial readjustments aimed at coping with this 
problem. Consequently, every financial indicator that uses 
capital in the denominator will appear increasingly inflated over 
this period of time. This is evident in panel A of Table 27, 
where gross return on capital shows impressive growth between 
29/ Figures for 1985 indicate that 70 percent of CNCA's 
credit was allocated to the priority sectors (agriculture, small 
and medium-size enterprises, and low-income housing). 
75 
Tabl1 27 
CNCA-Togo: Selected Financial Ratios, 1983 - 1986 
Indicator 
A. R•turn on Capital 
Gross Return on Capital• 
Profit margin• 
Net Return on Capitalc 
B. Return on Financial A11•t1 
Gross Return an Fin. Assets 
Financial costs I Fin. Assets 
Provisions I Fin. Assets 
Operational Costs 
(non-financial) I Fin. Assets 
Net Return on Fin. Assets 
Source: Based on CNCA records. 
1983 
138.0 
2.7 
3.8 
14.3 
5.9 
3.9 
4.2 
0.4 
a Income fro• financial operations I Capital. 
Viar 
1984 1985 1996 
Percent 
138.5 287.8 929.1 
-33.0 -25.9 -246.9 
-45.7 -74.6 -2294.2 
13.8 13.3 12.7 
5.7 5.4 5.6 
0.0 6.0 31.6 
4.7 5.3 1.0 
-4.6 -3.4 -31. 5 
b Net profit I Income from financial operations. 
c Net profit I Capital. 
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1983 and 1986, even though revenues from financial operations had 
indeed decreased, even in nominal terms, since 1984. 
On the other hand, increasing allowances for loan-loss 
provisions in the expense account, along with growing operational 
(non-financial} costs, have driven total expenditures up. As a 
consequence, net profits have gone from a small positive amount 
in 1983 to huge losses since 1984, that are clearly reflected in 
the indicators presented in Table 27. 
The changes in the composition of sources of funds pointed 
out above, from BCEAO rediscount to deposits, has helped to 
slightly reduce the cost of funds. However, the increases in 
operational {non-financial) expenditures during the period under 
analysis have outpaced the sluggish growth of financial assets, 
resulting in increasing average costs {see panel Bin Table 27). 
These changes, and the critical increase in allowances for 
provisions resulted in the bleak financial picture displayed in 
Table 27. 
Operational expenditures have increased allegedly due to 
increased loan recovery efforts and savings mobilization 
campaigns. A recent memorandum of the African Development Fund 
(ADF) indicates satisfactory rates of loan recovery (90 percent) 
for loans granted after 1983, as a result of improved loan 
allocation rules and procedures, and more effective loan recovery 
practices. Indeed, loan recovery and deposit mobilization 
campaigns in the cotton area, notably Notse, have reportedly 
yielded good results. Savings mobilization efforts undertaken on 
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an experimental basis in small villages of the Kpalime area also 
appear promising. This program, in association with the 
11 Association Village Entreprise" (AVE) deserves a brief 
description here, since it appears to deviate from the usual top-
down creation of credit delivery channels typical of development 
banking in most countries. 
The main objective of the AVE program for the CNCA is the 
creation of savings and loans organizations at the village level, 
which will eventually hold accounts at the CNCA. The AVE itself, 
a private voluntary organization supported by foreign funds, aims 
at "developing solidarity in rural villages, and providing 
incentives for the youth to remain in rural areas" (Nyuiadzi). 
Operating at present in 53 villages of the Kpalime area, the 
program grants small loans for three types of investments. In 
increasing order of magnitude these investments are: small water 
reservoirs, corn-storage silos, and corn mills. 
Loans obtained by the villages under the AVE program are 
repaid with the proceeds of crops collectively grown in community 
fields, in addition to the individual holdings of villagers. The 
AVE has helped the villages organize for these operations, and 
channeled funds from foreign donors {primarily Swiss aid) to the 
village beneficiaries of these loans. At present, the CNCA is 
considering funding some of these group loans, and at the same 
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time has assigned one agent full time to work with the AVE 
villages in the promotion of financial savings301. 
In summary, the financial situation of the CNCA appears at 
present critical. Ironically, in part the bleakness of the 
financial indicators is explained by sound and realistic measures 
recently adopted by the institution's management. Larger 
reliance on deposits, more realistic loan classification and 
accounting provisions, loan recovery campaigns, and savings 
mobilization efforts are all adequate measures in the right 
direction. Apparently, the CNCA-Togo is not totally isolated 
from the political pressures that characterize agricultural 
development banks in developing countries, but the recent 
managerial adjustments undertaken certainly differ from the 
trends and practices commonly observed in these banks. 
6.2. The "Caisse d'Epargne du Togo", CET 
The CET is an autonomous public financial institution 
created in 1959, regulated by the BCEAO since 1978. It accounted 
for about 4 percent of total private savings in the country in 
1986, mobilizing deposits through the post-office network and two 
agencies. While the two agencies are located in Lome, the 
branches of the postal system give the CET national coverage. At 
least one employee in each post off ice is devoted to servicing 
savings transactions on behalf of the CET. An internal survey of 
30/ A discussion of the CNCA/AVE program can be found in 
Vigan6 (1987). 
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savings accounts carried out in 1981 indicated that public 
employees were the single most important occupational group among 
the CET's clientele, and less than 1 percent was accounted for by 
farmers. However, more than one-half of the accounts are 
associated with miscellaneous unspecified occupations or no 
occupation at all (Masini and Calamanti). 
The major activity of the CET is the provision of deposit 
services to a clientele growing at about 7 percent per year (see 
Table 28). Of the two types of deposits offered by the 
institution, "ordinary" passbook savings accounts are predominant 
over the so-called "housing" savings. On average, less than 7 
percent of the accounts opened every year corresponded to housing 
savings between 1981 and 1986. Table 28 reports the behavior of 
all savings accounts for the period 1981-1986. The number of 
accounts shows a slow steady growth during this period, whereas 
real balances decreased until 1983, to recover in the last three 
years of the series. The average annual growth of real balances 
was a sluggish 5.4 percent, while real quasi-money in the economy 
grew at an average annual rate of 22 percent, and savings 
balances in credit unions averaged almost 30 percent real growth 
per year during the same period~1/. 
The single most important use of funds by the CET is loans 
to government and public institutions, or investments in public 
projects of "economic and social development" (CET). Even though 
the current composition of the asset portfolio was not disclosed 
31/ See the following section. 
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Table 28 
Caisse d'epargne du Togo: Savings D•pasits. Number of Accounts and 
Deposit Balances at Year End, 1981 - 1986 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Annud 
Average 
Number of Accounts 
Number 
124507 
134604 
144144 
154232 
164988 
173014 
Growth 
rate, X 
per year 
8. 1 
7. 1 
7.0 
7.0 
4.9 
6.8 
Deposit Balances 
Current 
FCFA '000 
3520483 
3804583 
3864583 
4180683 
4817983 
5418383 
Constant FCFA 1980 
('000) Growth rate 
X per year 
2941089 
2860589 -2.7 
2656071 -7.1 
2979817 12.2 
3496359 17.3 
3749746 7.2 
5.4 
Source1 Based on CET records. Accounting year ends on Septe•ber 30. 
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by the GET, figures available for 1982 indicate that 78 percent 
of the uses of funds were accounted for by these loans and 
investments. About one-fifth of the funds were deposited at the 
"Caisse de Depots et Consignations" (CDC) in Paris, and only 2 
percent were lent as mortgage loans. As Table 29 indicates, 
mortgage loans have increased substantially since 1981 but still 
represent less than 15 percent of the deposit balances being held 
at the institution. Furthermore, the amounts granted every year 
in mortgage loans have been systematically about twice as large 
as the annual increases in housing-savings balances, i.e., there 
is a net mobilization of liquidity from ordinary savings to 
housing loans. 
The rather conservative management of the CET has allowed 
the institution to break even in recent years, or experience 
small losses equivalent to about two percent of total deposit 
balances (1981 and 1986). However, these results do not appear 
to take into account the subsidy received from the postal service 
in the form of personnel and resources devoted to handling 
deposit transactions on behalf of the CET 32 /. 
The CET has not taken significant actions to benefit from 
the national coverage provided by the post-off ice network and 
increase its deposit mobilization at a pace in line with that of 
other financial institutions. At present, the operations of the 
CET represent a continuous transfer of financial savings from 
32/ The information provided by the CET on its financial 
statements was very limited, and it is not clear what expenditure 
items are included in the calculations of reported net revenues. 
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Table 29 
Caisse d'Epargne du Togo: Loans Outstanding to Private Individuals, 
and Loans I Deposits Ratios, 1981 - 198b 
Number Outstanding Balances Loans I 
Vear of 
-------------------------------
Deposits 
loans Current Constant FCFA 1980 Ratio 
FCFA'OOO ( '000) Growth rate :t. 
7. per year 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1981 
1982 
1983 
1904 
1985 
1986 
Annual 
Average, i. 
7 
14 
44 
bB 
96 
106 
b7000 
87200 
235000 
4b39b1 
647201 
782570 
55973 1. 9 
b5564 17.1 2.3 
161512 146.3 6.1 
330b92 104.7 11. 1 
4b9667 42.0 13.4 
541571 15.3 14.4 
65.1 8.2 
Source: Based on CET records. Accounting year ends September 30. 
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rural areas to government projects and public institutions, to 
balances held in Paris, and to a few large housing loans. 
6.3. The Credit Union Movement33 / 
The first "cooperative d'epargne et de credit'' (Coopec) in 
Togo was organized in 1967. Most credit unions created in the 
initial stages of the movement were the result of missionary work 
in the rural areas 34 /. The "Comite National pour le Developpement 
des Unions Cooperatives d'Epargne et de Credit" (CONAUDEC) was 
formed in 1969. Between then and 1979 more than 80 Coopecs were 
created, with financial assistance from Catholic Relief Services, 
"Pain pour le Mende", and 11 Brticke der Bruderhilfe". In 1980, the 
CONAUDEC with the assistance of these institutions, the World 
Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), and the USAID, initiated a new 
phase of development of the movement characterized by a substan-
tial increase in all growth indicators. This new phase included 
the recruitment of promotion agents and the installation of an 
office in Lome. In 1983, CONAUDEC became the "Federation des 
Unions Cooperatives d'Epargne et de Credit" (FUCEC). 
The main indicators of the growth of Togolese credit unions 
in the last decade are shown in Table 30. The total number of 
credit unions went from 77 in 1976 to 82 in 1980 (a 6.5 percent 
increase), and then to 96 in 1982 (a 17 percent increase with 
33/ This section relies upon Cuevas (1987). 
34/ The terms "Coopec" and "credit union" are used inter-
changeably in this report. 
Table 30 
Giufth of the Togo Credit Union ~t: An OVeIView. Figures as of December of each Year. 
---------
,.. ________ 
----------------·- __ .. __ -- ---
Year CXXJPF.CS bbersh.!IL_ Share capital Savi~~~}. ts ___ Loans futstanding _ 
Nunber Grc:Mth Nunber Grc:Mth FCFA'OOO Growth FCFA'OOO Grarth FCFA'OOO Grarth 
rate,% ratet.% __ rate,% _______ ...!:_ate.t.~-- -------- rate,% 
1976 77 - 2823 - n.a. - 24978.1 - 13513.1 
1977 85 10.39% 2895 2.5..')% n.a. - 29797.2 19.29% 18839.9 39.42% 
1978 92 8.24% 3628 25.32% n.a. - 33839.7 13.57% 18726.3 -0.60% 
1979 89 -3.26% 3739 3.06% n.a. - 43964.3 29.92% 18213.2 -2.74% CX> 
1980 82 -7.87% 3822 2.22% n.a. - 71431.5 62.48% 41598.0 128.39% .i:i. 
1981 97 18.29% 5375 40.63% n.a. - 109873.4 53.82% 65365.5 57.14% 
1982 96 -1.03% 5915 10.05% n.a. - 156881.3 42.7~ 94521.8 44.61% 
1983 74 -22.92% 6565 10.99% 11459.0 - 206092.3 31.37% 185910.6 96.69% 
1984 79 6.76% 7899 20.32% 14764.7 28.85% 325878.7 58.12% 266591.0 43.~ 
1985 84 6.33% 8894 12.60% 17000.6 15.14% 394405.6 21.03% 338340.9 26.91% 
1986 93 10.71% 10335 16.20% 18316.9 7.74% 452787.1 14.am> 381531.9 12.77% 
Annual Average 2.56% 14.39% 17.24% 34.7ZX. 44.60% 
-------- ---- --- -- ---
Source: CUevas (1987) • 
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respect to 1980). A restructuring of the movement in 1983 
reduced the number of Coopecs to 74 in 1983, but the number of 
organizations resumed its growing trend in the period 1984-1986. 
The average annual growth rate of membership until 1980 was 8.3 
percent per year, whereas between 1981 and 1985 the total number 
of members grew at an average annual rate of 18.5 percent. 
Overall, membership in Coopecs grew on average at a rate of 
14.4 percent per year during the decade under analysis. This is 
a substantial rate if one considers that population growth in 
Togo averaged less than 3 percent per year over the same period, 
and that most of the increase in membership corresponds to "new 
entrants" to the formal financial system. Given the predominan-
tly rural nature of the Coopecs (75 percent of the total number 
of cooperatives), and the fact that commercial banks are usually 
reluctant to service small depositors and small borrowers, it is 
likely that joining a credit union is the first contact of a new 
member with institutional finance. The membership growth figures 
reported in Table 30 indicate that the credit union movement has 
made a significant contribution to the increased access to 
financial services by the Togolese population. 
The increase of total savings and of loans outstanding in 
the Togo credit union movement during the last decade were even 
more striking than the membership growth discussed above {see 
Table 30). Savings (in current FCFA), already growing very 
rapidly until 1980, on average at 31 percent per year, increased 
even faster after 1980 at an average annual rate of 37 percent. 
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On the other hand, loans outstanding grew on average at almost 45 
percent per year in nominal terms during the decade (41 percent 
on average until 1980, 47 percent on average between 1981 and 
1986) . 
The relative size of the credit union movement in terms of 
the total amount of liquidity held by the movement (primarily 
savings plus share capital) vis a vis the Togolese economy is not 
large. The consolidated liabilities of credit unions represent 
less than one percent of Togo's quasi-money. However, the growth 
rates reported above exceed by far the growth of any other 
relevant aggregate. The real growth of the major liabilities and 
assets of Coopecs are contrasted against the real growth of 
quasi-money, private-sector credit, and gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the economy in Table 31. Quasi-money (i.e., interest-
earning liabilities of the banking system) is used as a frame of 
reference to assess the savings mobilization performance of 
Coopecs, whereas private sector credit granted by the banking 
system serves the same purpose for the evaluation of their 
lending activity. 
Coopec savings not only grew faster but also more steadily 
than quasi-money during the period under analysis. A comparison 
of columns 1 and 3 in Table 31 shows sharp fluctuations in the 
growth rate of quasi-money, especially in the first half of the 
period, that are not observed for Coopec savings balances. Both 
aggregates performed better in the sub-period 1981-1986 than in 
the first sub-period 1976-1980, even though both rates of growth 
R7 
Table 31 
Togo: Srowth Rates of CDDPEC Savings and Loans Outstanding Compared to the 
6rowth of Relevant Aggregates in the Togo Economy, 1977-1986. 
Srowth Rates in Percent per Year, in Real Terms 
Year COO PE Cs 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Savings 
Deposits 
( 1 ) 
-2.57 
13.02 
20.87 
44.60 
28.50 
28.51 
20.08 
63.98 
23.22 
9.48 
Annual Average 24.97 
Average 1976-80 18.98 
1981-86 28.96 
Source: Cuevas (1987). 
a Average 1977-1985. 
b Average 1981-1985. 
Loans 
Outstanding 
(2) 
% 
13.87 
-1.08 
-9.52 
103.27 
31.27 
30.14 
79.79 
48.71 
29.22 
7.54 
33.32 
~6.64 
37.78 
Quasi-
Money 
(3) 
% 
14.86 
44.18 
-23.36 
10.48 
-o. 12 
18.40 
17.01 
35.69 
35.62 
5.43 
15.82 
11.54 
18.67 
Togo Economy 
Private 
Sector 
Credit 
(4) 
% 
12.71 
14. 77 
4.09 
0.03 
-19.47 
-2.61 
-12.33 
3.46 
4.22 
7.27 
1. 21 
7.90 
-3.24 
Gross 
Doain.,;ti c 
P~..,duct 
(5) 
'X 
5.56 
10.0B 
6.79 
0.57 
-3.50 
-3.83 
-5.36 
1. 20 
3.50 
1.67 • 
5.75 
-1. 60 b 
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show a drop in the last year of the series, most likely a 
consequence of the overall economic recession prevailing since 
the beginning of the 80s. 
The high and steady growth rates of credit--union savings 
suggest an increasing importance of these institutions in the 
monetary system of the country. Furthermore, as suggested above, 
growth of savings in Coopecs is likely to reflect increased 
effective monetization in the economy, rather than reallocations 
of existing financial balances from one institution to another. 
The lending performance of Coopecs relative to the credit 
allocated to the private sector by Togo financial institutions 
was even more striking than that observed for savings deposits 
compared to quasi-money. Coopec loans outstanding (column 2 in 
Table 31) grew 30 times as fast as aggregate private sector 
credit in the economy (column 4). Growth of Coopec lending was 
particularly strong between 1980 and 1985, furthermore, the 
drastic contraction of private sector credit between 1981 and 
1983 associated with the economjc recession post-1980 was not 
observed in the outstanding balances of Coopec loans. 
Even though Coopec credit balances represent only about one-
half of a percent of total private sector credit in the economy, 
the fast growing trend of Coopec loans suggests rapidly 
increasing access to formal loans by small borrowers, especially 
in rural areas. Furthermore, loans granted by rural Coopecs 
represented almost 6 percent of institutional credit granted to 
the primary sector. Hence, the incidence of credit union lending 
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in rural areas is substantially more important than their overall 
share in private sector credit to the economy. 
A comparison of rural v~r~ urban credit unions through the 
analysis of membership, savings deposits, and loans outstanding 
results in the following pattern (see Appendix Tables 9, 10, and 
11) : 
( i ) There are important scale differences between rural and 
urban Coopecs. Urban credit unions are much larger than 
rural cooperatives, by all the indicators revised here. As 
a consequence, in spite of being less in number, the urban 
sector accounts for a majority of the membership, for the 
largest share in total deposits, and for the largest share 
in loans outstanding in the credit union movement. 
The common link associated with urban Yl~_a vis rural 
credit unions, the income gap between the urban sector and 
the rural sector, and the transactions costs implicit in 
community-based rural Coopecs are all factors that explain 
the scale differences between rural and urban organizations. 
Urban Coopecs, where the work place is usually the 
common link between the members, and where payroll-deduction 
mechanisms are normally arranged with the employer, can 
enjoy significant advantages in record-keeping, deposit 
gathering, and loan recovery, with respect to rural Coopecs. 
The latter face constraints determined by the geographic 
dispersion of the community that serves as common link for 
these cooperatives. Most importantly, rural credit unions 
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have to overcome the transactions costs associated with 
participation, which are minimal or non-existent in urban 
organizations. 
(ii) Growtp performance has been consistently superior in 
(iii) 
rural Coopecs in comparison to urban cooperatives. All 
growth indicators reported here for membership, savlngs 
mobilization and lending are stronger in rural credit unions 
than in urban Coopecs. 
This differential performance of credit unions by 
sector has to be associated with the emphasis placed by the 
Federation and supporting institutions in the strengthening 
of rural organizations. Training, promotion, and technical 
assistance, primarily on the improvement of management 
skills, have had a relatively more significant effect on 
rural Coopecs than on urban Coopecs. 
As a consequence of the pattern summarized above, the 
scale differences between rural and urban credit unions tend 
to gradually decrease. However, it would be inappropriate 
to expect that these gaps will disappear, due to the 
structural differences highlighted in point (i) above. 
An analysis of repayment performance of a sample of 58 
credit unions is summarized in Table 32. Due to differences in 
data availability this sample represents 77 percent of all rural 
Coopecs, but only 21 percent of all urban credit unions. This 
uneven representation must be kept in mind when interpreting the 
findings reported here. 
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Table 32 
Togo: Repayaent Rates 1n Rural and Urban Coopecs, as of Septe1ber 30, 1906. 
Rural Coopecs Urban Coopecs All Coopecs 
Repay1ent 
--------------------- --------------------- ----------------------
Category Nuaber A1ount Number Alount Nuaber A1ount 
of loans FCFA'OOO of loans FCFA'OOO of loans FCFA'OOO 
Not Overdue 398 8887.6 180 11056.5 578 19944.1 
Percent of total 32.31 37.41 79.3% 87.31 39.61 54.8% 
Less than 2 Honths Overdue 57 1347.0 B 105.0 65 1452.0 
Percent of total 4.6% 5.7X 3.SX O.Bl 4.4l 4.01 
2 - 6 Honths Overdue 149 4034.7 13 319.8 162 4354.4 
Percent of total 12.ll 17.0X 5.71 2.51 11.n 12.01 
b - 12 Honths Overdue 168 3696.0 6 291.1 174 3987.1 
Percent of tatil 13.61 15.61 2.6X 2.31 11.91 11.01 
1 - 2 Yeirs Overdue 131 2517.4 10 630.0 141 3147.4 
Percent of total 10.61 10.61 4.41 5.0X 9.71 8.61 
More thin 2 Years Overdue 331 3249.7 10 269.5 341 35!9.2 
Percent of total 26.Bl 13.71 4.41 2.n 23.31 9.71 
Total S11ple 1234 23732.2 227 12671.9 1461 36404.1 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~---Percent Overdue 67.7% 62.6% 20.71 12.71 60.41 45.21 
Percent More thin 
One Vt1r Overdue 37.4% 24.31 8.81 7.11 33.01 18.31 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------NU1ber of Coopecs 
in the Sa1ple 53 s SS 
--------------------------------------------------~--------------------------------------------
Source: Cuevas (1987>. 
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Overall, a majority of the loans (about 60 percent) in the 
sample of 58 Coopecs were overdue at the date of assessment. 
However, they represented about 45 percent of the loan amounts, 
i.e., the average amount of overdue loans is less than the 
average size of all loans. Since these percentages include loans 
even one day overdue, they tend to exaggerate the effective loan 
delinquency in the Coopecs under analysis. A more realistic 
indicator is the proportion of loan balances more than one year 
overdue (next to last row in Table 32). One third of the loans 
appear in this category considering all Coopecs in the sample, 
accounting for about 18 percent of total loan balances. 
There is a striking difference between overdue rates of 
rural loans compared to urban loans. Almost one-fourth of the 
loan balances of the rural Coopecs in the sample were more than 
one year overdue, whereas this proportion was about 7 percent 
among urban credjt unions. Over 60 percent of the loan balances 
of rural Coopecs had not been paid on time, while this proportion 
was less than 13 percent in urban Coopecs (see Table 32). This 
contrasting repayment performance is reflecting the different 
risk environment faced by the two types of institutions. Loan 
portfolios in rural credit unions tend to include a larger share 
of riskier enterprises, primarily agricultural production, than 
urban Coopecs. At the same time, this larger exposure to risk 
justifies the more careful asset management that rural Coopecs 
appear to have pursued in the recent past~£/. 
-----------
35/ See Cuevas (1987). 
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In summary, the analysis of the performance of Coopec 
savings and loans indicates a strong and steady growth of the 
movement for the period 1976-1986. Savings deposits and loans 
outstanding at Coopecs performed substantially better than any 
other relevant aggregate in the Togo economy, particularly during 
the overall economic contraction observed after 1980. Growth of 
rural Coopecs has been even stronger than the averages observed 
for the overall movement, even though they are more affected by 
loan repayment problems. Overall, the Togo Coopecs appear to be 
making a significant contribution to the monetization of the 
economy, and to the improvement of access to financial services 
by the rural population. 
6.4. An Overview of Rural Finance 
(a) The sources 
Less than 3 percent of total institutional credit goes 
to the primary sector. These institutional credit flows 
into the rural areas of Togo are accounted for primarily by 
the banking system. Bank credit to the primary sector 
represent 95 percent of total institutional credit to rural 
areas. The other five percent originates in rural credit 
unions. 
The CNCA is the individual institution with the largest 
agricultural portfolio, even though most of this lending 
corresponds to marketing loans. The institution appears to 
be overcoming a financial crisis by introducing sound 
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adjustments in managerial practices. The burden of a large 
delinquent portfolio remains an important concern and a 
constraint for the recovery of the CNCA. 
Not surprisingly, rural households rely upon informal 
borrowing to meet a large share of their financial 
requirements. Relatives, traders, and to some extent 
moneylenders, as well as participation in traditional forms 
of rotating savings and credit organizations, are important 
sources of financial assistance in rural areas. 
(b) The Uses 
On the other hand, the banks, the CET, and rural credit 
unions mobilize financial savings from rural households. 
Traditional savings groups and schemes, as well as informal 
lending are also important uses of liquidity in rural areas. 
Participation in traditional savings organizations and 
informal lending, as well as funds deposited in rural credit 
unions can be considered liquidity that circulates and stays 
in the rural sector. However, this report has shown that 
bank deposits are being channeled more and more to the 
UMOA's money market, i.e., not only outside of the rural 
areas but also outside of the country, since Togo holds a 
net creditor position in that market. On the other hand, 
deposits in the savings bank (CET) are funding government 
programs, holdings at the CDC in Paris, and housing loans. 
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banks and the CET may continue to channel liquidity flows away 
from the rural areas ~~1to urban areas and the exterior, unless 
rates of return to agricultural enterprises substantially 
improve. Price trends in cash crops appear to be following a 
promising path, but food crops remain a stagnant and penalized 
activity. 
Improved ret~rns to rural enterprises, in addition to the 
substantial capital inflows involved in rural development 
projects represent currently and potentially a strong base for 
financial intermediation in rural areas. The significant 
progress being made by raral credit unions, and the successful 
deposit mobilization efforts by the CNCA are positive signs in 
the assessment of the development potential of rural finance in 
Togo. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 1 
Togo: BrD'is Do1estic Product by Sector of Origin in Current Prices, 1978-1985 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ytar 
Sector 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
billi1111 Df c111T11tt CFA frillCI 
Pri1ary 54.4 55.4 63.1 70.2 72.5 90.t 93.4 97.3 
Agriculture 46.9 46.2 53.1 59.5 59.8 77.0 78.9 81.3 
Livestock, Forestry 7.5 9.2 10.0 10.7 12.7 13.1 14.5 16.0 
and Fishing 
Secondary 45.2 49.7 56.9 58.8 63.1 62.6 64.2 71.7 
"ining 12.0 17.7 21.9 24.6 26.9 28.7 30.6 30.8 
"anufacture 12.5 11.7 17.0 19.0 20.6 20.1 19.9 22.1 
Construction 20.7 20.3 18.0 15.2 15.6 13.8 13.7 18.8 
and Energy 
Tertiary 100.2 107.5 118.4 129.0 134.1 128.6 135.4 146.6 
Transport, Co11erce 79.4 84.5 93.1 102.0 106.6 100.8 106.5 119.0 
and Services 
Sovern1ent 20.8 23.0 25.3 27.0 27.5 27.8 28.9 27.6 
GDP at "arket Prices 199.8 212.6 238.4 258.0 269.7 281.3 293.0 315.6 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: World Bank, •country Econotic "11orandu11 1 June 1987. 
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Appendix Table 2 
Togo: Sectoral Shares in 6ross Doaestic Product, 1978-1985 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year 
Sector 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ptrc11t of Tntal SIP 
Pri1ary 27.2 26.1 26.5 27.2 26.9 32.0 31.9 30.8 
Agriculture 23.5 21.7 22.3 23.l 22.2 27.4 26.9 25.B 
Livestock, Forestry 3.8 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.7 4.7 4.9 5.1 
and Fishing 
Secandary 22.6 23.4 23.9 22.8 23.4 22.3 21.9 22.7 
"ining 6.0 8.3 9.2 9.5 10.0 10.2 10.4 9.8 
"anufacture 6.3 5.5 7.1 7.4 7.6 7.1 6.8 7.0 
Construction 10.4 9.5 7.6 5.9 5.8 4.9 4.7 6.0 
and Energy 
Tertiary 50.2 50.6 49.7 50.0 49.7 45.7 46.2 46.5 
Transport, COHerce 39.7 39.7 39.1 39.5 39.5 35.8 36.3 37.7 
and Services 
Bovern11nt 10.4 J0.8 10.6 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.9 8.7 
&DP at "arket Prices 100.0 JOO.O 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Appendix Table l. 
APPENDIX TABLE 3 
TOO): L~ AN~ TOiAL .6S&TS IN lliE B~KI~ SYSTEM BY INSTITUTIOO, 1980 - 1986. 
(MILLIOO CFA FIW(S) 
-- ---· - - ------·-- -- -- -- pgRI~----- ·--- - --- --·------·-----
1980 
- ___ 1~BL _______ !982 ___ ---· _J98~11!______ 1984/85 1985/8~------------
TOTAL TOTAt TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
~!~JAL tNST!TtlT!~ LOANS AS.SSS LOANS -~S LOANS A$&TS ~~ _§§fTS .h~ §§_ETS ____ 1.~ ~~ ---- _ 
£.N.~-!:._ __ __ _ _ __ 7110. __ 9~64 8329 10442 8325 10195 12~~ _ }~9~L _ 12479 J1.J9Q ___ 9JlL 20635 _______ _ 
!T!> ----- - ------ _7~99 9392 1182 _9~32 ___ 7264 _12292 - -- ~~~ J.1317- __ 7)09 .1168! 8037 12338 
~1!1~ -- - --- __ 6!~ 5686 1258 6920 1474 7439 ~1_?] __ _ 10264 ____ - 1226_J_0097_ 1290 _1;..;,.;06..o..;;10 __ 
~~ _ . _ ___ _ ___ ~~!S 1~~1 18611 363~7 18749 44292 14150 m~t ____ 1~.m _ 5430!. ___ 1904LJ79Til _______ _ 
~rcL ___ _____ 1~~19_ ~~Mo __ 11m 22553 1om 23!6~ __ .m~ __ m~s ____ !~6~o 3!2_9.? ___ tE4J_~m ______ _ 
?1@-TOXl ----- 7284 _ J~~-6 __ -~678 1m1 __ 8?8! _2_D50~ _ ~3_7~ ?]~~? ---·· !Q~ _ -~~51_ _ 10600 _ 3293~ __ --·---
~-I __ ___ _ ___ ---~~L _ ~5_D7 1429 4326 1855 8050 
-- - - - --- --
5~7J __ ~7 __ -- ]999_247~2- ___ 1~1~12 __________ _ 
BALT~ ______ t?.L __ ~~9 --~~~7 ___ 4~L- )~~ ~~ _ 3494 6617 3491 7511 4614 8855 
EK:G 1§~_ - _lli2 ----- J??!. _J~5 _____ !5?1 ___ 4?l6 ____ 1Q.!L..ll.QL ___ 2032 •. J!68 2046 4713 
TOT~----__ M~SLJ0051J ___ ~!684 __ 114208_--~?I!_131~95 _6690t_ 177345 67405 198768 77530 211902 
Scu-ce: ~. "BilM des~ et des etablissanents finn:iers de L'\nioo mtaire a.iest africaine" nl Ulfllblisl'a:I data. 
I-' 
0 
.... 
APPENDIX TABLE 4 
TOGO: DEPOSITS HELO BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC, 
THE GOVERNMENT ANO THE INTERNATIONAL (NON-FINANCIAL) INSTITUTIONS WITH THE BANKING SYSTEM, 1980 - 1986 
( MILLION CFA FRANCS ) 
(YEAR) 
1980 1981 1982 
-
1983/1984 1984/1985 1985/1986 
GOVERN- GOVERN- GOVERN- GOVERN- GOVERN- GOVERN-
GENERAL MENT & GENERAL MENT & GENERAL MENT & GENERAL MENT & GENERAL MENT & GENERAL MEIH & 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION PUBLI.f___ OTHERS PUBLIC OTHERS 
_  _ft!!!li~--~9Jl'fi5__~~UBLI_L _QifiERS _~_ PUBLI ~ _ QJHERS PUBLIC OTHERS 
C.N.C.A. 2832 1295 3542 1012 4449 1196 4899 3636 6005 5694 8333 6497 
STD 1752 110 1596 264 1679 0 2708 577 2117 900 4079 852 
SN! & Fft 2890 1216 3138 1703 2110 1582 4786 2521 5464 2336 6710 2083 
...... 
0 
UTB 18494 4525 16272 3592 15182 3453 27499 6352 30687 8043 36081 11476 "' 
BTCI 9058 330 10491 10!1 13509 3662 18108 6552 18828 7316 24373 6152 
BI AO-TOGO 6889 240 7623 419 11018 681 18197 2062 24068 3463 20534 4621 
BCCI 1009 0 2056 203 4606 590 10669 1935 10406 2938 11105 3344 
BAL TEX 1492 1337 1564 621 1422 734 1686 1685 2155 1341 3111 l223 
BCG 1121 39 905 200 1359 181 1629 382 2554 402 2352 394 
TOTAL 45536 9090 47185 11024 55933 12080 90181 25702 102294 32433 116678 36642 
Source: BCEAO, Statistiques economiques et monetaires, various issues. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 5 
TOGO: INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT BY TERM STRUCTURE AND SECTOR, 1981 - 1986 
( MILLION CFA FRANCS ) 
(YEAR) 
TERM STRUCTURE SECTOR 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
SHORT TERM AGRICULTURE 710 805 565 581 486 366 
MINING 8108 9260 3744 4294 3348 10656 
MANUFACTURING 5710 6762 7429 7544 3520 3118 
ELECTRICITY, GAS, WATER 444 0 37 801 76 168 
CONSTR. & PUBLIC WORKS 4017 3858 3322 3725 3715 4742 
TRADE 15440 18375 19762 18396 19269 19465 
TRANSPORTS & COllllllUNICATIONS 1327 1582 1679 1488 1850 1887 
INSURANCE & REAL ESTATE 236 258 324 308 350 275 
SERVICES 605 806 890 929 951 1116 
TOTAL 36597 41706 37752 38067 33565 41793 
of which: 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES 21122 22703 25395 25567 26243 26803 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 15475 19003 12357 12500 7322 14990 
MEDIUM TERM AGRICULTURE 528 485 492 672 635 582 
MINING 686 286 156 2640 2615 2614 
MANUFACTURING 3748 3930 3443 2814 1927 2306 
ELECTRICITY, GAS WATER 1155 829 614 595 571 446 
CONSTR. & PUBLIC WORKS 90 294 258 191 482 384 
TRADE 1115 1758 2192 3152 4082 4179 
TRANSPORTS & COMMUNICATIONS 336 270 284 235 237 411 
INSURANCE & REAL ESTATE 189 273 710 597 682 629 
SERVICES 3684 3540 4299 4221 4517 4476 
TOTAL 11531 11665 12345 15117 1574.8 16027 
of which: 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES 8780 9744 10516 10913 11826 12539 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 2751 1921 1829 4204 3922 3488 
LONG TERM AGRICULTURE 79 96 43 43 43 43 
MINING 132 132 0 0 0 0 
MANUFACTURING 297 297 280 134 101 130 
ELECTRICITY GAS WATER 0 115 0 0 0 0 
CONSTR. & PUBLIC WORKS 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TRADE 40 40 41 41 4 20 
TRANSPORTS & COMMUNICATIONS 10 10 10 0 0 5 
INSURANCE & REAL ESTATE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SERVICES 109 166 388 560 772 761 
TOTAL 667 856 762 778 920 959 
of which: 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES 337 378 510 745 920 959 
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 330 478 192 33 0 0 
Source: BCEAO, Statistiques economiques et monetaires, various issues. 
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Appendix Table 6 
Togo: Total Institutional Credit by Sector, 1981 - 1986 
Vear 
Sector 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
•i 11 ions of CFA Francs 
Primary• 1317 1386 1100 1296 1164 991 
Secondary 24387 25763 19283 22738 16355 24564 
Mining 8926 9678 3900 6934 5963 13270 
Manufacture 9755 10989 11152 10492 5548 5554 
Energy & Utilities 1599 944 651 1396 647 614 
Constr.& Public Works 4107 4152 3580 3916 4197 5126 
Tertiaryb 23091 27078 30579 29927 32714 33224 
Co111111erce 16595 20173 21995 21589 23355 23664 
Transp.& Communic. 1673 1862 1973 1723 2087 2303 
Ins.Sc Real Estate 425 531 1034 905 1032 904 
Services 4398 4512 5577 5710 6240 6353 
TOTAL 48795 54227 50962 53961 50233 50779 
of which: 
Private Enterprises 30239 32825 36481 37225 38989 40301 
Public Entreprises 18556 21402 14481 16736 11244 18478 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: BCEAO, Statistiques econoaiques et acnetair1s, various issues. 
a Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry and Fisheries. 
b Excludes government. 
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Appendix Table 7 
Togo: Public Investaent by Sector of Destination and Source of Financing, 1981-19Bli 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Tohl 1981-1986 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 FCFA Percent 
billion of total 
l 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
billions of CFA frilACs 
A. li1tribution by SICtars 
Rural Developaent B.B 6.0 5.4 11.6 13.5 14.1 59.4 29.9 
Industry, Handicraft 8.3 0.9 0.6 2.0 1.8 b.1 20.3 10.2 
and Co1nrce 
Infrastructure 15.0 9.7 9.9 12.0 20.9 24.5 92.0 46.3 
Ad1inistration, Social 3.0 5.0 5.5 4.7 4.3 4.7 27.2 13.7 
Sector and others 
Total Inv11t1111t 35.1 21.6 21.4 30.3 40.5 50.0 198.9 100.0 
Expendi turn 
B. Fin1ncing 
Do1estic 14.9 5.9 3.9 5.7 8.8 16.1 55.3 27.8 
External 20.2 15.7 17.5 24.6 31.7 33.9 143.6 72.2 
of .tiich: 
Grants 4.6 5.4 5.9 11.2 11.4 10.2 48.7 24.5 
Loans 15.6 10.3 11.6 13.4 20.3 23.7 94.9 47.7 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: World Bank, •country Econo1ic Ke1orandua1 , June 1987. 
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Appendix Table B 
CNCA-Togo: Deposit Portfolio. Composition at Year End, 1983 - 1986 
Type of Deposit 1983 
Current acct. individuals 16.67. 
Current acct. institutions 28. 17. 
Savings accounts 23.87. 
Time deposits 31.57. 
Other deposits 1. 3X 
Total 100.07. 
Year 
1984 1985 1986 
Percentilge Co•position 
9.37. 13.14 11. 3'.X. 
29.27. 28. lX 24.37. 
27. 47. 25. O'Y. 26.bi. 
34. n 33.n 37.87. 
2. 77. 1.17. o. 4X 
100.07. 100. O'l. 100.07. 
Averilge 
1983-1986 
12.67. 
27.47. 
25. TX 
34.31.. 
1. 4X 
100.0'X 
Source: Based on CNCA records. Accounting year ends on September 30. 
Appendix Table 9 
Togo: Quarterly GrcMth Rates of bbership in Rural and Urban Coopecs. 
September 1983 - December 1986. 
Rural Coopecs Urban Coopecs All Coopecs 
Date ------------------------~--- ------------~---------~--------- --·~------------------·------- -- ---
Nunber of Nunber of Members I Nunber of Nunber of Members I Nunber of Nunber of Members I 
Members Cbopecs Coopec funbers Cbopecs Coopec funbers Coo pees Coopec 
% % % % % % % % % 
--·- ---
_____ , 
--- -
30-Sep-83 
31-Dec-83 5.9 3.7 2.1 5.5 0.0 5.5 5.6 2.8 2.8 
31-ftbr-84 11.3 1.8 9.4 2.1 11.1 -8.1 5.5 4.1 1.4 
30-Jtm-84 4.6 0.0 4.6 4.0 0.0 4.0 4.2 0.0 4.2 
30--Sep-84 3.8 1.8 2.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 3.9 1.3 2.6 
31-Dec-84 5.1 0.0 5.1 5.4 5.0 0.4 5.3 1.3 4.0 
31--M:lr--85 2.1 0.0 2.1 3.9 0.0 3.9 3.2 0.0 3.2 I-' 0 
30-Jtm-85 2.1 0.0 2.1 2.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 -l 
30-Sep-85 3.7 5.2 -1.4 1.6 0.0 1.6 2.4 3.8 -1.3 
31-Dec-85 4.1 0.0 4.1 4.6 9.5 -4.5 4.4 2.4 1.9 
31-Mar-86 0.6 0.0 0.6 1.2 4.3 -3.0 1.0 1.2 --0.2 
30-Jtm-86 0.9 6.6 -5.3 4.2 0.0 4.2 2.9 4.7 -1. 7 
30--Sep-86 1.9 0.0 1.9 4.5 0.0 4.5 3.6 0.0 3.6 
31-Dec-86 7.9 6.2 1.7 8.0 0.0 8.0 7.9 4.5 3.3 
~terly 
average 4.2 1.9 2.2 3.9 2.3 1.7 4.0 2.0 2.0 
Source: Cuevas ( 1987) . 
Ap[:erKlix Table 10 
Togo: Quarterly GrcMth Rates of Saving"S Deposits in Rural a00 UI'ban Coopecs, 
in Real Terms, September 1983 - December 1986. 
Rural Cbopecs Urban Coopecs All Coopecs 
Date ------------------------- -------------------------~---- -~ ··~----------------------·-------
Deposits Deps. I Deps./ Deposits Deps. I Deps./ Deposits Deps. I Deps./ 
Coo pee bber Coopec ~r Coo pee ~r 
% % % % % % % % % 
---·- -----·- ---·-~---~ ------- ·--- ----~--
30-Sep-83 
31-Dec-&~ 20.1 15.8 13.4 13.8 13.8 7.8 14.4 11.3 8.3 
31-Mar-84 6.9 5.0 -4.0 11.7 0.5 9.4 11.2 6.9 5.4 
30-Jun-84 7.3 7.3 2.5 8.7 8.7 4.5 8.5 8.5 4.1 
30-Sep-84 14.1 12.2 10.0 17.4 17.4 12.9 17.1 15.6 12.7 I-' 0 
31-Dec-84 11.5 11.5 6.1 15.9 10.4 10.0 15.5 14.0 9.7 co 
31-Mar-8..'> 13.5 13.5 11.1 6.6 6.6 2.6 7.3 7.3 3.9 
30-Jun-85 6.2 6.2 4.0 2.7 2.7 0.7 3.1 3.1 1.0 
30--Sep-&5 6.8 1.6 3.0 0.9 0.9 --0.7 1.5 -2.2 --0.9 
31-Dec-85 6.5 6.5 2.3 4.0 -5.0 --0.6 4.3 1.8 --0.1 
31-Mar-86 3.0 3.0 2.4 -2.9 -2.9 -4.1 -2.2 -2.2 -3.2 
30-Jtm-86 0.7 -5.5 --0.2 1.2 1.2 -2.8 1.2 -3.4 -1.7 
30--Sep-86 5.5 3.9 3.5 7.5 3.0 2.8 7.3 4.9 3.6 
31-Dec-86 11.6 6.8 3.5 2.8 2.8 -4.8 3.8 0.4 -3.8 
Quarterly 
Average 8.7 6.7 4.4 6.9 4.6 2.9 7.1 5.1 3.0 
Source: Cuevas (1987). 
Append.ix Table 11 
Togo: Quarterly GrcMth Rates of Loans Outstanding in Rural and Urban Coopecs, 
in Real Terms, September 1983 - December 1986. 
-------Rural Coopecs Urban Coopecs All Coopecs 
Date ------------~----------~- -~--------
_____________ R ___________________ 
-------~----------~-~-----~-
Wans Loans I Loans/ Loans Loans I Loans/ Loans Loans I Loans/ 
Coopec Member Coo pee Member Coo pee Member 
% % % "' % % % % % ,.. 
30-Sep-83 
31-~--83 35.5 27.3 27.9 26.4 11.6 19.8 27.0 17.5 20.2 
31-Mar-84 -1.5 2.6 -11.5 5.6 5.6 3.4 5.1 8.4 -0.3 
30-Jun-84 10.6 4.1 5.7 5.1 -5.9 1.1 5.5 -2.1 1.2 
30-Sep-84 20.8 18.5 16.4 15.9 15.9 11.5 16.2 14.6 11.9 I-' 31-Dec-84 9.5 9.5 4.2 15.2 9.4 9.3 14.8 13.2 9.0 .:::> 
31-Mar-85 -2.5 -2.5 -4.5 5.7 0.6 1. 7 5.1 3.7 1.9 .0 
30-Jun-85 24.5 19.9 22.0 -0.5 -0.5 -2.5 0.9 -1.8 -1.1 
30-Sep-85 18.7 18.7 14.5 3.9 3.9 2.2 4.9 4.9 2.5 
31-Dec-85 0.0 -3.6 -3.9 11.1 6.0 6.2 10.2 5.9 5.5 
31-Mar-86 -9.2 -9.2 -9.7 -3.1 -11.2 -4.3 -3.5 -6.0 -4.5 
30-Jun-86 -2.0 -7.0 -2.9 -2.3 -2.3 -6.2 -2.2 -5.8 -5.0 
30-Sep-86 12.6 3.8 10.4 0.3 0.3 -4.1 1.2 -4.6 -2.3 
31-Dec-86 15.3 17.2 6.9 13.2 13.2 4.9 13.4 14.7 5.0 
<Ptrterly 
Average 10.2 7.7 5.8 7.4 3.6 3.3 7.6 4.8 3.4 
Source: CUevas (1987). 
